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 It may not shock the American conscience to learn that during slavery, courts in 
non-slave-holding states were sometimes called upon to enforce contracts for the 
purchase and sale of human beings (or contracts whose consideration otherwise consisted 
of human beings), and sometimes did so,1 for reasons arguably having more to do with 
 
1 See, e.g., Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 358 (1810); Comm. v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 
Pick.) 193 (1836). 
3inter-state contract law than with the “peculiar institution” itself.2 What may be more 
surprising, and more difficult to understand, is that some “Union” courts went on doing 
so even after the Civil War ended,3 when substantive changes of law, together with well-
 
2 Slavery was referred to as the “peculiar institution” in various 19th century sources, 
perhaps most famously by John C. Calhoun, “Speech on the Reception of Abolition 
Petitions” (1837). 
3 Cases were reported from two states that did not officially secede, but did join the 
Confederate States of America, Kentucky (Bailey v. Howard, 2 Ky. Op. 294 (1868)) and 
Missouri (Phillips v. Evans, 38 Mo. 305 (1866)); and two unequivocally Union states, 
Illinois (Roundtree v. Baker, 52 Ill. 241 (1869), discussed infra) and West Virginia 
(Matthews v. Dunbar, 3 W. Va. 138 (1869)); as well as all eleven of the states that 
officially seceded, Alabama (McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 48 (1870); Fitzpatrick v. 
Hearne, 44 Ala. 171 (1870); Arkansas (Haskill v. Sevier, 25 Ark. 152 (1867), aff'd, 26 
Ark. 133 (1868), error dismissed, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 12 (1872); Jacoway v. Denton, 25 
Ark. 625 (1869), error dismissed, 154 U.S. 583 (1872); Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 654 (1872), rev'g 18 F. Cas. 846 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1870) (No. 10,595);); Florida 
(Walker v. Gatlin, 12 Fla. 9 (1867); McNealy v. Gregory, 13 Fla. 417 (1870)); Georgia 
(Hand v. Armstrong, 34 Ga. 232 (1866) (enforcing); Shorter v. Cobb, 39 Ga. 285 (1869) 
(denying enforcement on basis of state constitutional prohibition); White v. Hart, 39 Ga. 
306 (1869) (same), rev'd, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872); Louisiana (Wainwright v. 
Bridges, 19 La. Ann. 234 (1867) (denying enforcement as a matter of contract law); 
Boyce v. Tabb, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 546 (1873)); Palmer v. Marston, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 10 
(1872)); Mississippi (Bradford v. Jenkins, 41 Miss. 328 (1867)); North Carolina (Harrell 
4established exceptions to general principles favoring out-of-state contract enforcement, 
made the contrary outcome at least equally available.4 Why?  And what can we learn 
from it? 
Accounting for these decisions requires more than simple charges of judicial 
racism or reactionary politics, even if well-founded.  Prior and contemporaneous 
decisions sometimes took a more progressive, liberatory approach.  We do better by 
seeking to uncover the intellectual and political pressure placed upon developing 
conflicts of law doctrine by the politics and the legal impedimenta of slavery.  A more 
fine-grained approach reveals more, and (it is hoped) may contribute more, to the 
ongoing exploration not only of the conceptual and legal foundations of slavery, but also 
of reparations for slavery.      
 
v. Watson, 63 N.C. 454 (1869); West v. Hall, 64 N.C. 43 (1870)); South Carolina 
(Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283 (1870)); Tennessee (Young v. Thompson, 42 Tenn. (2 
Cold.) 596 (1865); Curd v. Bonner, 44 Tenn. (4 Cold.) 632 (1867); Lewis v. Woodfolk,
61 Tenn. 25 (1872)); Texas (Hall v. Keese, 31 Tex. 504 (1868)); and Virginia (Scott's 
Ex'x v. Scott, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 150 (1868)). 
4 The U.S. Constitutional dimensions of this issue, and the paradoxical unity of interest in 
denying enforcement to such contracts shared by “neoabolitionists” and Confederate 
debtors, are ably explored by Andrew Kull, “The Enforceability after Emancipation of 
Debts Contracted for the Purchase of Slaves,” 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 493 (1994).  Kull 
focuses primarily on the intra-state jurisprudence of the former Confederate states during 
Reconstruction, and what he calls “the ‘slave consideration’ controversy,” Id. at 494, 
rather than the interstate or choice of law dimensions of the issue.   
5Explication of the legal doctrines some judges understood to stand in the way of 
total repudiation of slave contracts is not an apologia, but a caution.  It is entirely too easy 
to dismiss these judges and their opinions of nearly a century and a half ago as 
anachronistic and irrelevant, racist, insensitive, and cynical, and congratulate ourselves 
on our greater enlightenment.  This can unfortunately breed complacency, instead of 
turning a mirror on our own use and abuse of today’s legal concepts to frustrate, rather 
than further, goals of equality and anti-subordination, of “justice” however defined – 
what the French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas called (in another context) “the 
danger of a premature good conscience.”5
This Article addresses both how (from a doctrinal point of view) and why (from a 
legal, moral, and jurisprudential point of view), these contracts went on being enforced, 
outside the former Confederacy, even after the Thirteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, abolishing slavery, took effect in 1865.6 A significant part of the 
analysis will involve a close reading of selected Illinois Supreme Court cases, 
 
5 Emmanuel Levinas, “Toward the Other,” in NINE TALMUDIC READINGS 14 (trans. 
Annette Aronowicz) (1994). 
6The Thirteenth Amendment provides as follows:  
“Section 1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or 
any place subject to their jurisdiction.  
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”  
It took effect as the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution on December 18, 1865. 
6culminating in 1869’s Roundtree v. Baker,7 which is intended to show that the legal 
treatment of slavery in the non-slave-holding states, before and after the Civil War, was 
neither consistent and thorough repudiation, nor hypocrisy, indifference, or sympathy; 
instead, moments of moral and legal clarity seem to cohabit with tortured exercises of 
abstract principle thinly disguising cowardice, self-interest, and equivocation.  The most 
fair and useful history attempts to do justice to these contradictory tendencies, and I will 
offer some tentative suggestions in that direction.  Finally, I will address the “road not 
taken,” in which a federal district court in the 1870 Arkansas case of Osborn v. 
Nicholson8 interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment to deny enforcement of the payment 
obligations on contracts for the purchase and sale of human beings,9 only to find itself 
reversed a year later by the U.S. Supreme Court,10 definitively rejecting this approach as 
an unconstitutional impairment of vested contract rights11 and abandoning denial of such 
contracts as a legal avenue for furthering anti-subordinatory ends.    
 
7 1869 WL 5419 (Ill.), 52 Ill. 241 (1869). 
8 18 F.Cas. 846 (1870). 
9 The Arkansas jurisprudence is addressed by Kull, see note 4 supra, at 502-507. 
10 13 Wall. (80 U.S. 654) (1871). 
11 13 Wall. at 662 (“it is a sufficient answer to say that when the thirteenth amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States was adopted, the rights of the plaintiff in this action 
had become legally and completely vested.  Rights acquired by a…contract executed 
according to statutes subsequently repealed subsist afterwards, as they were before, in all 
respects as if the statutes were still in full force”).  As Kull puts it, after Osborn (and a 
group of cases decided with it), “The states could not, consistent with the contracts 
7I.  Theory:  Comity, Foreign Contracts, and the “Public Policy” Exception
There were two primary choice of law doctrines implicated during the antebellum 
period when a court in a non-slave-holding state adjudicated a lawsuit involving human 
beings as consideration for a contract.  The first was that a contract valid in its place of 
making is valid everywhere, even if such a contract would be invalid in the forum in 
which enforcement is sought.  The applicable law, in other words, was that of the place of 
making, lex loci contractus, and not the (potentially contrary) law of the state of 
enforcement (lex fori).12 Up until the 19th century, each state or nation’s agreement to 
uphold this principle was understood to be based on something called “comity.”  
Originating in Dutchman Ulrich Huber’s extremely influential 1689 essay “De conflictu 
legum diversarum in diversis imperiis,” “Comity was defined as something between mere 
courtesy and a legal duty, as derived from the tacit consent of nations and based on 
mutual forbearance and enlightened self-interest.”13 
The U.S. Supreme Court described it this way: 
 
clause, prohibit the enforcement of debts for slaves….As a practical matter, the 
controversy over slave contracts was essentially over.”  Kull, supra note 4, at 504-505. 
12 There are some nuances here, particularly when the place of making differs from the 
contemplated place of performance, neither of which is the state where enforcement is 
sought – interesting and important, but not strictly relevant for our purposes here and 
beyond the scope of this discussion.  See, e.g., Eugene Scoles, et al., CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(4TH ED. 2004) 987, § 18.13 et seq. 
13 Eugene Scoles, et al., CONFLICT OF LAWS 14 (4TH ED. 2004). 
8‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on 
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is 
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard 
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own 
citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.14 
Comity in turn supports the general rule of contract validation.  As James Kent, an 
early-19th century American scholar, put it, “a contract valid by the law of the place 
where it is made is valid everywhere jure gentium [by the law of nations]….If it were 
otherwise, the citizens of one nation could not contract or carry on commerce in the 
territories of another.”15 This concept of comity, developed to manage the legal 
relationships among sovereign European nations, was then applied in the local American 
inter-state context.  Huber’s ideas entered American law primarily through Joseph 
Story’s 1834 work, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, “the 
first comprehensive conflicts treatise in English,”16 and took hold in the United States 
universally.17 “Comity” was thus understood as providing a basis for the enforcement of 
 
14 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 143, 16 S.Ct. 139, 163-164 (1895). 
15 2 Kent, Commentaries on American Law 364 (1st ed. 1827), in Scoles 19, note 6. 
16 Scoles, p. 18. 
17 “‘Comity’ sought to reconcile the territoriality (sovereignty) of states with the need to 
consider foreign law in appropriate cases.  The doctrine was generally accepted as an 
operational theory in the [U.S.] courts during the half century from 1850-1900,” 
whereupon, after considerable criticism, it gave way to what became known as the 
9out-of-state agreements that would be invalid had they been contracted within the forum 
by forum domiciliaries. 
 Equally well-established, at least theoretically, was the most significant exception 
to this principle of contract validation, generally referred to as the “‘public policy’ 
exception.”18 This exception (related to the European ‘ordre public’ exception to the 
 
“vested rights” theory of Joseph Beale. Scoles at 20; Currie, Kay, Kramer and Roosevelt, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 12-13 (7th ed. 2006).  It appears in the Restatement, First, Conflict of 
Laws (1934) at § 332, which states:  “Law Governing Validity of Contract. The law of 
the place of contracting determines the validity of a promise with respect to (a) capacity 
to make the contract; (b) the necessary form, if any, in which the promise must be made; 
(c) the mutual assent or consideration, if any, required to make a promise binding…”  
Despite important differences between comity and vested rights theory, Beale’s approach 
did not represent any significant change with respect to enforcement of contracts; as 
Beale himself expressed it, “A right having been created by the appropriate law, the 
recognition of its existence should follow everywhere.  Thus an act valid where done 
cannot be called in question anywhere.”  J. Beale, 3 CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW 517 
(1901).  “To Professor Beale, the place-of-making rule was as obvious as the laws of 
nature,” citing Beale, “What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract,” 23 Harv. L. Rev.
260, 270-71 (1910), in Currie, et al., at 22. 
18 John Bernard Corr, “Modern Choice of Law and Public Policy: The Emperor Has The 
Same Old Clothes,” 39 U. Miami L. Rev. 647, 649 (1985), refers to what I am calling 
“the public policy exception” simply as “public policy.” “For the purpose of choice of 
law, one may define public policy as that doctrine which permits a court to reject a cause 
10
application of foreign law in a different nation’s courts19) permitted a court to refuse 
enforcement where such enforcement would conflict with the public policy of the forum.  
From the beginning, states reserved to themselves the power to decline enforcement of 
truly repugnant out-of-state agreements, reminding the world at large that the enforcing 
court exercised its power in support of the out-of-state (or “foreign”) contract as a matter 
of comity only, of something like self-interested and pragmatic friendliness between 
states,20 and not out of any felt or real sense of Constitutional or other legal obligation.21 
As to foreign contracts specifically, Story stated in his Commentaries,
of action based on the law of a different jurisdiction on the ground that the other 
jurisdiction’s law is not only different from put also offensive to generally accepted 
values within the forum.”  Id. at 649. 
19 See Scoles, § 18.4, at 959: “the traditional ordre public exception, [under which] the 
public policy of the forum qua forum is always the last shield against the application of a 
repugnant foreign law.”  As Joseph Story put it, the forum need not recognize foreign 
laws “where those laws are deemed oppressive” or “their moral character is questionable, 
or their provisions impolitic.” 3rd ed. at § 33. 
20 See, e.g., Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1, 6 (1816) (“But, as the laws of foreign 
countries are not admitted ex proprio vigore [by its own strength], but only ex comitate,
the judicial power will exercise a discretion with respect to the laws they may be called 
upon to sanction; for, if they should be manifestly unjust, or calculated to injure their own 
citizens, they ought to be rejected”). 
21 See Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 14. 
11
Contracts…which are in evasion or fraud of the laws of a country, or the 
rights and duties of its subjects, contracts against good morals, or religion, 
or public rights, and contracts opposed to the national policy or 
institutions, are deemed nullities in every country…although they may be 
valid by the laws of the place, where they are made.22 
And Story gave specific examples of contracts “against good morals, or religion, 
or public rights”:23 
Such are contracts…for future illicit cohabitation and prostitution; 
contracts for the printing or circulation of irreligious and obscene 
publications; contracts to promote or reward the commission of crimes; 
contracts to corrupt or evade the due administration of justice; contracts to 
cheat public agents, or to defeat the public rights; and in short, all 
contracts which in their own nature are founded in moral turpitude, and 
are inconsistent with the good order and solid interests of society.  All 
such contracts, even though they might be held valid in the country where 
they are made, would be held void elsewhere, or at least ought to be, if the 
 
22 Joseph Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN 
REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO 
MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS (2nd ed. 1841) §244(3) (p. 
323 in the 2001 Lawbook Exchange reprint). 
23 Story, 2nd ed., § 258(2), p. 334. 
12
dictates of Christian morality, or even of natural justice, are allowed to 
have their due force and influence.24 
The contemporary (and oft-quoted) locus classicus for the standard is surely 
Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (a tort case), where he stated 
that the public policy exception is not to be applied to deny enforcement of a right, unless 
enforcement in the forum “would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some 
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.”25 
As a more contemporary New York court put it, “Even if [a] contract is valid where 
made, it will not be enforced in another State if it is repugnant to positive statutory 
enactment and the public policy of that State.”26 
24 Story, 2nd ed., § 258(2), pp. 334-335 of reprint. 
25 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918); see Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws § 90 cmt. c (1971) (commentators agree that foreign based rights should be 
enforced unless the judicial enforcement of such contract would be the approval of a 
transaction that is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing 
moral sense (citing Intercontinental Hotels Corp. (Puerto Rico) v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 
13 (1964).)). 
26 Clifton Steel Corp. v. General Electric Co., 80 A.D.2d 714, 715, 437 N.Y.S.2d 734, 
735 (1981), quoting Lynch v. Bailey, 275 A.D. 527, 90 N.Y.S.2d 359, aff’d, 300 N.Y. 
615, 90 N.E.2d 484 (1949). 
13
At the same time, it should be noted that although it was (and is) robust 
doctrinally, the public policy exception was not widely applied, at least during the period 
with which we are concerned.27 According to a mid-twentieth century source, 
Research into the case law establishes at least one solid fact:  The reported 
cases in which foreign law, applicable under the usually appropriate 
conflicts rule, is not used solely because the law to be applied is 
‘obnoxious’ or ‘repugnant’ to the public policy of the forum are few 
indeed….The argument that an entirely foreign claim should not be 
enforced because it is repugnant to the forum has undoubtedly been made 
 
27 Monrad Paulsen and Michael Sovern, “‘Public Policy’ in the Conflict of Laws,” 56 
Colum. L. Rev. 969 (1956).  Paulsen and Sovern completed a thorough review of the 
cases up to that time, found just a handful of contract cases employing the exception, and 
concluded, “An enormous number of cases have refused to apply the public policy 
doctrine to foreign contracts.”  Id. at 974 and note 21.  Some later cases (from selected 
jurisdictions) applying the exception are collected in Corr, supra note 18.  It may be that 
the exception was actually more frequently used in the second half of the twentieth 
century than in the first, which would be an interesting result as that period also marked 
the widespread adoption of the Restatement (Second) approaches to conflicts of law.  See 
also Holly Sprague, “Choice of Law: A Fond Farewell to Comity and Public Policy,” 74 
Cal. L. Rev. 1447, 1465 and passim (1986).  Sprague, a strong critic of both doctrines, 
identifies contemporary cases (three from 1985 alone) in which “comity” and “public 
policy” are (mis-?) used.  
14
most often in contract cases, but it has met with surprisingly little 
success.28 
In addition, while even today the public policy exception is apparently well-
established in American law,29 appearing in both the First and the Second Restatements 
of Conflict of Laws,30 it continues to be poorly understood even by commentators, who 
frequently confuse, or fail to differentiate, between the use of the public policy exception 
to ground a forum’s refusal to apply foreign law in general (when its own choice of law 
principles suggest or require that it should); a refusal to recognize a foreign claim or
28 Paulsen and Sovern, supra note 27, at 972. 
29 Though widely criticized by commentators, including Paulsen and Sovern, supra note 
27, at 1016 (“The principal vice of the public policy concepts is that they provide a 
substitute for analysis.  The concepts stand in the way of careful thought, of 
discriminating distinctions, and of true policy development in the conflict of laws”); 
Sprague, supra note 27 (who argues that to the extent that the public policy of the forum 
should matter in choice of law, it is better accounted for by modern “interest analysis” 
approaches than traditional concepts of comity and public policy). 
30 Restatement (First) § 612 recognizes the doctrine to bar suits “upon a cause of action 
created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy 
of the forum.”  It also appears in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 90 
(1971).  As Corr, supra note 18, at 649, notes, the public policy exception “is one of the 
few features of the old learning to have survived the last generation’s surge into modern 
choice of law thinking.”  Corr later remarks, “It is a fact, however, that public policy is a 
firmly rooted feature of modern choice of law doctrines.”  Id. at 671. 
15
defense (when the forum typically does not (yet or any longer) recognize such a claim or 
defense);31 and our concern here, namely, a forum’s refusal to enforce a foreign 
contract.32 The considerations appropriate to each employment of the exception are at 
least potentially distinct, and criticisms based on examples of one type do not necessarily 
apply to the others.  Nevertheless, the existence and basic contours of the public policy 
exception have long been well-defined and widely accepted.33 
31 Paulsen and Sovern are careful not to make this mistake.  Paulsen and Sovern, supra 
note 27, at 979 (“We have been dealing thus far with cases in which the courts have 
refused to take jurisdiction because to do so would violate the forum’s public policy.  
There is, in addition, authority for the proposition that public policy can be used by the 
plaintiff to strike down a defense even though the forum has no contact with the 
transaction before it”). 
32 This confusion is unfortunately common in casebooks.  See, e.g., Russell Weintraub, 
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.6, pages 106-112 (5th ed.) (discussing 
seriatim “a rule [emphasis added] found in the state designated by the forum’s choice-of-
law rule;” a case involving a foreign defense (marital immunity), not available in the 
forum; enforcement of a foreign contract unenforceable in the forum; an out-of-state tort 
damages limitation; a torts case; then a foreign (international) law case – all in the service 
of jettisoning the public policy exception).  
33 “All the commentators would retain the public policy principle in conflicts to the extent 
that it is grounded in basic moral conceptions or in ideas of fundamental justice, and we 
agree.”  Paulsen and Sovern, supra note 27, at 1015.  But see, e.g., Sprague, supra note 
27, at 1447-1448, arguing that comity and choice of law are “vague and lacking objective 
16
II. Practice: Four Stories of Slavery and Law in 19th Century Illinois
A contract for the purchase and sale of human beings, for which enforcement is 
sought in a non-slave state, would seem to be tailor-made for the public policy 
exception.34 For jurists in a state that prohibits slavery, what sort of agreement could 
more profoundly conflict with “good morals…or public rights,” be more “pernicious and 
 
standards…and that the values reflected in the comity and public policy doctrines are 
better served by more focused policy-oriented methods.”  In fact, she goes so far as to 
argue, “Since the doctrines of comity and public policy can no longer serve a useful 
purpose, they should be abandoned by modern courts and relegated to background studies 
of the evolution of choice-of-law doctrine in the United States.”  Id. at 1448. 
34 Paulsen and Sovern agree, without analysis: “Our courts properly should deny effect to 
a foreign contract of slavery.”  Paulsen and Sovern, supra note 27, at 980.  At least one 
English case actually so held, applying the English version of the public policy exception 
to comity to refuse to return enslaved persons who escaped from Florida (then a Spanish 
slave-holding province) onto a British ship.  Forbes v. Cockburn, 2 Barn. & C. 448, 9 
E.C.L. 199 (FULL CITE).  Judge Holroyd stated, “The plaintiff, therefore, must recover 
here upon what is called the comitas inter communitates [comity of nations], but it is a 
maxim that cannot prevail in any case where it violates the law of our country, the law of 
nature, or the law of God.” As Judge Caldwell describes, “the court, holding that slavery 
was contrary to the law of nature and the law of God, the defendant [the British officer in 
command] had judgment.” Osborn v. Nicholson, 18 F.Cas. at 847.   
17
detestable,”35 more “repugnant to positive statutory enactment and the public policy of 
that State,”36 than a contract for a slave?  What sort of contract could be “in [its] own 
nature” more deeply “founded in moral turpitude” than one purporting to traffic in human 
beings?37 In the modern era, a federal court in Illinois used the public policy exception to 
refuse enforcement of a New Jersey contract arising from a gambling debt.38 Surely 
 
35 Greenwood v. Curtis, supra note 1, 6 Mass. at 358.  Strikingly, in Hinds v. Brazealle, 2
Howard 837, at *3 (Miss. Err. App. 1838), the Mississippi court used this same language, 
even citing Greenwood, to explain why it would refuse to give effect to an Ohio deed 
emancipating a Mississippian’s slave (at a time when manumission required ratification 
by the Mississippi legislature).  The “offence [sic] against morality, pernicious and 
detestable as an example,” Id. at *4, is Elisha Brazealle’s attempt to avoid the laws of 
Mississippi, and emancipate an enslaved woman and her son, “John Monroe Brazealle,” 
acknowledged by Elisha as his own son, to whom Elisha also sought to devise his entire 
estate.  Id. at *1. 
36 Clifton Steel Corp. v. General Electric Co., supra note 26.  
37 Under the Second Restatement, a “fundamental policy” of the forum will overcome 
even the parties’ own contractual choice of law clause.  Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws §187(2)(b) (1971).  Comment g provides that “a fundamental policy may be 
embodied in a statute which makes one or more kinds of contracts illegal.”  Surely a 
Constitutional provision banning slavery would qualify (especially where the contracts in 
question did not contain choice-of-law clauses). 
38 Resorts International Hotel, Inc. v. Zonis, 577 F.Supp. 876 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
18
slavery was more offensive to mid-nineteenth-century Illinois jurists, than gambling is 
today?  And yet…   
As part of the Northwest Territories, Illinois was and always had been a non-
slave-holding state.  The sixth article of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the founding 
legal document of Illinois, prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude except as a penal 
sanction.39 Illinois was admitted to the U.S. as a state on December 3, 1818,40 and the 
first section of the sixth article of the Illinois Constitution stated, “Neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude shall hereafter be introduced into this state, otherwise than in the 
punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”41 The first 
section of the eighth article of the Illinois Constitution stated, “That all men are born 
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights; among 
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, and of acquiring, possessing 
and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.”42 
39 Ordinance of 1787, “An ordinance for the government of the territory of the United 
States northwest of the River Ohio,” art. VI, reprinted in Isaac F. Patterson, THE 
CONSTITUTIONS OF OHIO 52 (1912).  
40 THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 370 (2003). 
41 Ill. Const. of 1818, art. VI (1970).  But see Paul Finkelman, SLAVERY AND THE 
FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 37-80, 2nd ed. (2001), which 
argues that the 1787 Ordinance did not effectively abolish slavery in the Northwest 
Territories, and that it was not finally abolished in Illinois until ratification of the Illinois 
Constitution of 1848 
42 Ill. Const. of 1818, art. VIII, § 1 (1970). 
19
That slavery was inconsistent with the official public policy of Illinois is clear;43 
what remained to be seen was whether or to what extent the policies embodied by these 
documents would be used by Illinois courts to decline enforcement of legal arrangements 
treating people of African descent and the labor of their bodies as the property of others.  
The balance struck by nineteenth-century courts between the repudiation of slavery and 
the slave trade, on the one hand, and adherence to traditional contract-validating 
principles, on the other, even by courts in unequivocally abolitionist states, reveals much 
about the willingness, or unwillingness, of such courts to use law actively to dismantle or 
undermine slavery.   
The Illinois cases wrestling with these issues culminate in Roundtree v. Baker,44 
in which the 1869 Illinois Supreme Court ordered payment on an antebellum Kentucky 
slavery contract.  The rationale offered in Roundtree demonstrates how conventional 
modes of legal reasoning, even in jurists of otherwise apparently good conscience, may 
lead to missed opportunities to deploy existing legal technologies in ways that further 
liberatory, anti-subordination, and anti-racist policies and views.45 The goal of studying 
 
43 Commentators critical of the public policy exception have drawn attention to the 
perhaps inappropriately broad range of legal (or even non-legal) materials used by forum 
courts as sources of the purported “public policy” of the forum.  See, e.g., Corr, supra 
note 18, at 658-659.  No one, however, has suggested that the forum state’s Constitution 
is not a proper source of public policy. 
441869 WL 5419 (Ill.), 52 Ill. 241 (1869). 
45 See Adrienne Davis, “The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective,” 
51 Stan. L. Rev. 221 (1999), for an unparalleled scholarly elucidation of this approach. 
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this case thus extends beyond coming to a clearer and more accurate picture of Illinois 
Reconstruction-era law, valuable and important as that is; it also contains lessons whose 
significance is not merely historical.46 
Let us turn now to the cases.  
1. Nance v. Howard (1828) 
Nance was a girl born into slavery in the early 1800s.47 Sometime before Illinois 
statehood, she was brought into the territory of Illinois, where the operation of Illinois 
law converted her status from slave to “registered servant” until the age of 32.48 Her 
erstwhile master then found himself in debt, and the creditor sought to execute upon his 
property, including Nance herself.  The same law that rendered slaves registered servants 
further provided that she was “liable to be sold by her master upon her giving her consent 
in the ‘presence of a justice of the peace.’”49 Nance v. Howard addresses the question of 
whether a person whose labor may be bequeathed, assigned and otherwise voluntarily 
alienated by another, may also be transferred involuntarily, for his debt. 
 
46 Roundtree has also been used as an example of the courts’ general reluctance to 
employ the public policy exception, the idea being that if courts will tolerate even out-of-
state contracts for slavery, what will they not validate?  See Paulsen and Sovern, supra 
note 27 at 972-973.  As I hope will become clear in this Article, I think it is dangerous to 
take slave contracts as an “example” of anything else. 
47 Nance v. Howard, 1 Ill. 242, 1828 WL 1651 (Ill.) (1828), *5. 
48 Id. at *5. 
49 Id. at *5. 
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The 1828 Illinois Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Samuel 
Lockwood,50 concluded that she might be.51 More precisely, the court concluded that 
nothing operated to exempt Nance from an 1825 law providing for the seizure and sale of 
“all and singular, the goods and chattels, land and tenements and real estate”52 of a 
 
50 The official Supreme Court of Illinois website provides the following biographical 
information about Justice Lockwood.  “Samuel D. Lockwood was born on August 2, 
1789 in Poundridge, New York. He studied law under Francis Drake and was admitted to 
the bar in New York, where he began his legal practice. He also served as justice of the 
peace and master in chancery. In 1818, Justice Lockwood moved to Illinois and 
continued the practice of law in Carmi. He moved to Edwardsville in 1821, after the 
legislature elected him to the office of Attorney General. He became the receiver of the 
Edwardsville Land Office in 1823. The legislature appointed him to the bench of the 
Illinois Supreme Court in 1825. When the legislature divided Illinois into nine judicial 
circuits in 1841 and required supreme court justices to preside over circuits, Justice 
Lockwood was responsible for the First Judicial Circuit. He represented Morgan County 
at the 1848 Illinois Constitutional Convention which ultimately reduced the number of 
supreme court justices from nine to three. Lockwood resigned from the bench the same 
year. Originally a Whig, Justice Lockwood joined the Republican party in 1855. In 1851, 
he was appointed Legislative Trustee of the Land Department of the Illinois Central 
Railroad. He held that position until his death on April 23, 1874, in Batavia, Illinois.” See 
http://www2.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Previous/Bio_Lockwood.asp.
51 1828 WL 1651 at *2. 
52 Id. at *2. 
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judgment debtor.  This, despite the fact that while prior laws listing forms of property 
available for execution for debt specifically identified “the time of service of negroes and 
mulattoes,” the 1825 law did not.53 Nevertheless, Lockwood interpreted the 1825 law to 
include the missing provision explicitly permitting the attachment “on slaves, indentured 
or registered colored servants and live stock,”54 and concluded that Nance’s seizure and 
sale on execution was also proper.55 
In order to avoid the sale sought by the judgment creditor, Justice Lockwood had 
only to read the 1825 execution statute, which explicitly repealed all former acts, as 
excluding execution on human beings (or their bound labor).  To read it in this way 
required simply that he give the omission of any express provision for the sale the 
significance most naturally and reasonably following from the change from the prior laws 
of 1807, 1819, and 1823 – that such “property” was no longer to be included.56 He might 
also have drawn support from the consent provision of the law relating to indentured 
servants, for the proposition that a person in that condition is not simply a chattel, and 
ought not be subject to execution on the same terms as inanimate goods, animals, or land.     
Instead, Lockwood labored intellectually not to reach this conclusion – to explain 
why the 1825 law actually did include, and hence permit, what it literally omitted (and 
impliedly prohibited).  To the argument that the omission implied exclusion, he 
responded,   
 
53 Id. at *2-3. 
54 Id. at *4. 
55 Id. at *4. 
56 Id. at *2-3. 
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This inference would no doubt be correct, if these servants were only 
made liable to execution by express enactment of the legislature, but from 
the review of the legislation in relation to indentured and registered 
servants, I am inclined to the opinion that the legislature have always 
regarded them as property, and that the object of the legislature in 
expressly authorizing them to be sold on execution, was not to introduce a 
new rule, but to remove “doubts” that had arisen on the subject.57 
Quære whether the “doubts” sought to removed by prior laws might have arisen because 
the constitution of Illinois prohibits the traffic in human beings, and whether the felt 
necessity to permit such executions, explicitly, by legislative enactment three separate 
times, contradicts the claim that anything other than express enactment of the legislature 
could legitimize such executions (and other legal vestiges of slavery).  Note further that 
Lockwood implicitly acknowledged that the “plain meaning” of the statute is that persons 
are exempt from execution, hence his interpretation required recourse to legislative 
intent.  He could not even rely on legislative history (there may be none recorded) – he 
simply read the prior legislation and formed an “opinion” at odds with the text. 
Lockwood continued, 
If, then, the statutes concerning executions are only to be considered as 
declaratory of what the law was, then the omission of a similar provision 
in the act of 1825, can not be deemed decisive of the intention of the 
 
57 Id. at *3 (quotation marks in original). 
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legislature.  The intention must, therefore be sought in the “several acts in 
pari materia and relating to the same subject.”58 
The “several acts” to which he refers are, in fact, the prior, expressly repealed, 
laws, revived by Lockwood and read together with the 1825 law that repealed them, for 
no purpose other than to permit execution on a specific category of property explicitly 
identified in those prior enactments, but omitted from the law governing the case.   
After performing this questionable legal legerdemain, Justice Lockwood then 
answered his own question – “Are then registered servants, goods or chattels, within the 
meaning of the [1825] statute [providing for the seizure and sale on execution]?” – 
affirmatively, and even commented, “This is a question of mere dry law, and does not 
involve in its investigation and decision, any thing relative to the humanity, policy, or 
legality of the laws and constitution, authorizing and recognizing the registering and 
indenturing of Negroes and mulattoes.”59 Little remained, indeed, once he had 
disregarded whatever legislative intent inhered in the consent provision for transfer of 
indentured servants’ time of service (perhaps, some recognition of the bound laborers’ 
consciousness, volition, and hence their “humanity”), and resolved the arguably 
ambiguous omission of bound labor from executable property against the statute’s plain 
meaning.   
What might Lockwood have done instead?  He might have read the 1825 statute 
straightforwardly, interpreting the deletion of “the time of service of negroes and 
mulattoes” from the operable version of the statute as putting such assets beyond the 
 
58 Id. at *3. 
59 Id. at *2. 
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reach of the execution statute.  In general, property that is freely alienable is also 
reachable for debt; it appears both unfair and inconsistent to allow someone to keep 
valuable property while his creditor remains unsatisfied.  At the same time, creditors are 
not (and never have been) permitted to reach every article of the debtor’s property, and 
making an exception for bound labor could find support in the consent provision that 
distinguishes this transfer from the debtor’s power over his other freely-alienable 
“property.”60 In current parlance, surely her labor was “held primarily for the personal, 
family, or household use of the debtor,”61 and in that way resembles exempt property. 
Moreover, had Nance consented to a voluntary transfer, the proceeds of such a 
transaction would of course have been reachable by the creditor.  But had the debtor 
preferred to continue to exercise the rights over Nance and her labor permitted him by the 
Illinois law of the time, he would simply have had to satisfy his debt out of his own labor 
(or other property), rather than hers.  This is hardly a radical outcome – it would have left 
Nance in very nearly the same condition she was in prior to the lawsuit – yet it would 
 
60 Today, exemptions are found in the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C.A. § 522, and cover, 
inter alia, such items as a dollar-value-limited interest in a residence, an automobile, 
“household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, 
crops, or musical instruments, that are held primarily for the personal, family, or 
household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor,” 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(3), 
jewelry, “implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor,” 11 
U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(6). 
61 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d). 
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have represented a small step in the right direction, furthering distinguishing Illinois’ 
“registered servant” status from slavery.  Yet Lockwood declined to take that step.  
2. Hone v. Ammons (1852) 
 The dispute in Hone v. Ammons arose from a contract for the purchase and sale of 
a man.62 We are never told the name or age of the man Hone purported to sell to 
Ammons, nor do we learn very much about him, other than that he “was walking abroad 
as free as Hone himself, and for aught that appeared had ever been so.”63 Under the law 
of the time, the man’s presence in Illinois itself raised a legal presumption of his free 
status, and, notably, Hone’s testimony that the man was his escaped slave was held 
insufficient to establish even that he was a slave, much less that he belonged to Hone.64 
Though Ammons had executed a promissory note for the purchase price, and did not pay, 
Hone had no recovery against him.65 For Justice John Caton,66 one member of the three-
 
62 Hone v. Ammons, 14 Ill. 29, 1852 WL 4379 (Ill.). 
63 Id. at *1. 
64 Id. at *1. 
65 Id. at *1. 
66 Caton’s official biography provides as follows: “John Dean Caton was born on March 
19, 1812, in Monroe, New York. He studied law under Beardsley and Matterson in Utica, 
New York, Wheeler and Barnes in Rome, New York, and James H. Collins in Vernon, 
New York. In 1933 he moved to Chicago, where he obtained a license to practice law 
from Judges Samuel Lockwood and Theophilus Smith and opened Chicago’s first law 
office with Giles Spring. Caton was the secretary of Illinois’s first political convention, 
which took place in Ottawa, and in 1834, he was elected as a justice of the peace. In 1837 
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judge panel (and a former apprentice of Justice Samuel Lockwood), this was an end of 
the matter.   
In concurrence, Justice Lyman Trumbull,67 who would later go on, as a U.S. 
 
he was elected an Alderman in Chicago. Governor Thomas Carlin appointed Caton as an 
associate justice of the Illinois Supreme Court in 1842 to fill a vacancy on the court. 
Governor Thomas Ford reappointed him in 1843 to fill another court vacancy. The 
general assembly reappointed Caton to the bench when the Ford appointment expired. 
With the adoption of a new state constitution in 1848, the voters elected Caton to one of 
the three positions on the Supreme Court. He became Chief Justice when Samuel H. 
Treat resigned from the bench in 1855, and he became Chief Justice again in 1857. Caton 
resigned from the court in 1864, having served nearly 22 years. He was interested in 
telegraph lines and at one time controlled all such lines in Illinois until he leased them to 
the Western Union Telegraph Company. A widely traveled man, Caton’s interest in 
natural history led to his publication of numerous pamphlets and papers on various 
subjects. Caton died on July 30, 1895, in Chicago, Illinois. He is buried in Ottawa, 
Illinois.”  See http://www2.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Previous/Bio_Caton.asp.
67 Trumbull’s official biography provides as follows:  “Lyman Trumbull was born on 
October 12, 1813, in Colchester, Connecticut. He was admitted to the bar in 1836 in 
Georgia, and moved the following year to Belleville, Illinois, to practice law. In 1840, he 
won election to the state legislature on the Democratic ticket. The following year 
Governor Thomas Carlin appointed him Secretary of State, and he held that position until 
1843. Trumbull continued to practice law until 1848, when he was elected to the Illinois 
Supreme Court. He was reelected for a nine-year term on the bench in 1852, but he 
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Senator, to chair the Senate Judiciary Committee and introduce the resolution that 
became the Thirteenth Amendment, offered an analysis more thoroughly grounded in 
choice of law concepts, and one that reaches the same conclusion regardless of whether 
the man had been formerly enslaved by Hone.  Citing Story, he reiterated the basic 
principle of contract validation:  
As a general rule, the validity of a contract is to be determined by the law 
of the place where it is made....If valid where made or to be performed, it 
is by the general law of nations held valid everywhere.68 
Trumbull then applied the public policy exception:  
[A] contract made in Illinois, for the sale of a person as a slave, who is at 
the time in this State, and to a citizen thereof, is opposed to the policy 
 
resigned in 1853, after his election to Congress as an Anti-Nebraska Democrat. The 
following year, the Illinois legislature elected Trumbull over Abraham Lincoln, James 
Shields, and Governor Joel Matteson for a seat in the United States Senate. While in 
office, Trumbull joined the Republican party after its formation in 1857. He chaired the 
Senate judiciary committee and introduced the resolution that became the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865. He voted 
against the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson and was associated with the 
Liberal Republican movement. Trumbull returned to the Democratic party in the 1870s. 
He served in the Senate until the expiration of his third term in 1873. Justice Trumbull 
moved to Chicago and continued the practice of law until his death on June 25, 1896, in 
Chicago.”  See http://www2.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Previous/Bio_Trumbull.asp.
68 1852 WL 4379 at *2. 
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which the people of Illinois thought proper to adopt in the foundation of 
their State government, and in the very teeth of the express provisions of 
the constitution.69 
Trumbull went further still:   
A part of this contract, the consideration of the note, was the sale of a 
negro in Illinois, to a citizen of Illinois, as a slave. Is there room for 
question even, that the sale of a person in this State as a slave is contrary 
to the policy of our State government, to say nothing of the express 
declarations of the constitution?70 
For Trumbull, the Illinois State Constitution did not simply permit non-
enforcement of such a contract, but mandated it:   
In a legal point of view, I would as soon think of enforcing a contract to 
carry into effect the African slave trade, as that under consideration. The 
one is forbidden by an act of Congress, and the other by the fundamental 
law of the State; both of which are equally binding upon this court….[N]ot 
only was the contract made in Illinois, a State in which slavery is not 
allowed by law, but the slave who was the subject-matter of the contract 
was at the time in Illinois, and the purchaser was also a resident of the 
same State. For the court to lend its aid to the enforcement of such a 
contract, would, in my opinion, be a violation of all principle and all 
 
69 Id. at *2. 
70 Id. at *2. 
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authority.71 
It might be argued that this is, in a sense, too “easy” a case, from a conflicts-of-
law point of view.  In today’s choice of law vocabulary, the state whose law should 
govern any transaction is the state having “the most significant relationship”72 to it – and 
that is clearly Illinois (although it is apparently not the domicile of would-be vendor 
Hone).  The contract negotiation and execution occurred there, the purportedly enslaved 
 
71 Id. at *2, *4. 
72 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971) provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
“(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are 
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most 
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6. 
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the contacts to 
be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to 
an issue include: 
(a) the place of contracting, 
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract, 
(c) the place of performance, 
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and 
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the 
parties.  
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to 
the particular issue.” 
31
person (“the subject matter of the contract”) was physically located there, and the 
purchaser was also an Illinois resident.  Modernly, the consequence is that local Illinois 
law, under which such a contract is illegal and unenforceable, is most likely to be applied 
(whatever the forum state might be).  
While it appears that Hone was a Missouri domiciliary,73 and hence might 
imagine himself entitled to the benefit of Missouri law, the difficulty of imagining how 
the performance of the contract on his part could be successfully carried out either in 
Illinois or in Missouri suggests either a fraud on his Illinois buyer or a desperate attempt 
to use the Illinois courts effectively to re-enslave this man – unavailing in either case.  
The case is also too “easy” because the Illinois court favored its own domiciliary, in 
relieving him of his obligation to pay the out-of-stater on the note (while also, we should 
remember, upholding or establishing the free status of the unnamed man).    
Nevertheless, for an antebellum case, Hone is clearly much more promising than 
Nance. Rather than endeavoring to defend the property rights of one person in another, 
or avoid “offending” the State of Missouri or the Missourian Hone, Trumbull identified 
this contract as an example of the prohibited slave trade, and was neither modest nor 
apologetic in reading the Illinois constitution as straightforwardly barring its enforcement 
in Illinois.    
3. Rodney v. Illinois Central (1857) 
Not long after the 1855 case of Hone v. Ammons, an enslaved man named Joseph 
fled from slavery in Missouri, made his way to Cairo, Illinois, and got aboard an Illinois 
 
73 1852 WL 4379 at *3 (“The moment the master sold the negro, if the sale was valid, he 
ceased to owe service or labor in the State of Missouri, under the laws thereof”). 
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Central Railroad Company train to Chicago.74 His self-described “owner,” one Thomas 
Rodney of Missouri, sued the railway company in Illinois state court for, inter alia,
trespass on the case, an all-purpose tort claim referred to by the time of this opinion 
simply as “case” (seeking damages of $3000 for the loss of Joseph’s services); and trover 
for conversion (the property action used to seek damages for the value of an item of 
personal property, in this case Joseph himself).75 
Rodney lost, the defendant railroad won – but obviously the real “winner” was 
Joseph, who (like the unnamed “man” in Hone) was fortunate enough to find himself in a 
state whose courts would not permit themselves to be used by out-of-state slave owners 
to vindicate their purported property rights in other human beings.  Justice Onias 
Skinner76 of the Illinois Supreme Court was crystal-clear in affirming the court below:  
 
74 Rodney v. Illinois Central, 19 Ill. 42, 1857 WL 5640 (Ill.). It is not entirely clear from 
the opinion whether he also rode an Illinois Central train from Missouri to Cairo, Illinois. 
75 Id. at *2. 
76 Skinner’s official biography provides as follows:  “Onias C. Skinner was born in 1817 
in Floyd, New York. He moved to Peoria, Illinois in 1836, but soon moved to Ohio where 
he studied law and was admitted to the Ohio bar. In 1840 he moved to Carthage, Illinois, 
and then to Quincy. Skinner served a term in the state legislature from 1848 - 1850. In 
1851, Skinner was elected judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, which was composed of 
Adams, Brown, McDonough, Hancock, Henderson, and Mercer counties. In 1855, he was 
elected a justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, after the resignation of Samuel H. Treat 
and served until resigning in 1857. Skinner also served as a member of the 1870 state 
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neither case nor trover will lie, because “[t]he owner…by force of the laws of another 
State, under the law of Illinois, has no property in the fugitive, and can here, under State 
authority, assert no property in, or power over him,”77 leaving Rodney to seek his 
remedy, if any, in federal court under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.78 The Illinois 
Supreme Court went further, and declared, “[t]he law of Missouri, under which the negro 
owes service to the plaintiff, [is] repugnant to our law and the policy of our institutions, 
[and] neither by the law of nations or the comity of States, can affect the condition of the 
fugitive slave in this State, or, within our jurisdiction, give the owner any property in or 
control over him.”79 The Court concluded,  
Property in persons being repugnant to our laws and the genius of our 
State institutions, our courts will not enforce, as a general rule, the laws of 
other States recognizing this species of property, where the cause of 
action, based upon such laws, arises in this State….[Rodney], under the 
local law [of Illinois], where the alleged conversion occurred, had no 
property in the negro, and none under that law…could vest in the 
[railroad].80 
constitutional convention. He practiced law until his death on February 4, 1877, in 
Quincy, Illinois.”  http://www2.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Previous/Bio_Skinner.asp.
77 1857 WL 5640 at *2. 
78 Id. at *3. 
79 Id. at *3. 
80 Id. at *3-4. 
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After Rodney, it would appear that the stage was set for the direct repudiation of 
any contract for the purchase and sale of a human being.  However legally valid such an 
agreement might have been in its place of making, if sought to be enforced in Illinois, 
enforcement could be declined through a straightforward application of the public policy 
exception.81 
4. Roundtree v. Baker (1869) 
Such a contract finally came before the Illinois Supreme Court in Roundtree v. 
Baker in 1869,82 by which time, of course, the Civil War and the Thirteenth Amendment 
had intervened.  For a court already apparently poised to decline enforcement of slave 
contracts before the Civil War, one might think that a nationwide Constitutional ban on 
slavery would only strengthen its position. 
 
81 Rodney was influential enough that, after it was published, someone went back and 
added a long footnote to the opinion in Nance v. Howard, supra, sketching the contours 
of the legal understanding of slavery in Illinois as of Rodney. This footnote to Nance 
notes first that “the present constitution of this state does not permit slavery within the 
state.” Nance, at *1.  On this basis, “Negroes within [Illinois] jurisdiction are presumed to 
be free.” Id. Because “[s]lavery is the creation of municipal regulations in states where it 
exists…such regulations have no extra-territorial operation or binding force in another 
sovereignty.” Id. Furthermore, “[a] contract made in Illinois for the sale of a person as a 
slave, who is at the time in the state, and to a citizen of the state, is illegal and voId.” Id.
Finally, the footnote says explicitly that “[t]he laws of other states recognizing slavery, 
[are] repugnant to the laws and policy of the institutions of Illinois.” Id.
82 1869 WL 5419 (Ill.), 52 Ill. 241 (1869). 
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The transaction at issue in Roundtree took place long before the Civil War; 
specifically, on October 10, 1833,83 when Dudley Roundtree of Kentucky sold an 
enslaved girl, Eliza, to his relative Turner Roundtree of Illinois, for $400.84 In Kentucky, 
Turner gave Dudley a “writing obligatory,” a bond containing his written promise to 
pay.85 The price was to be paid in 20 annual installments of $20 each, beginning on 
 
83 In this respect, the transaction can be distinguished from those at which the Southern 
movement for “debt relief” was aimed.  See Kull, supra note 4, at 528 (“Those slave 
contracts most clearly in view had been entered into shortly before the war, or after its 
inception”).  Interestingly, some conflicts commentators have suggested that it would be 
appropriate to deny enforcement in general where “a debtor [would] be forced to utter 
ruin by the enforcement of a contract.”  Paulsen and Sovern, supra note 27, at 1008, 
quoting 2 Rabel, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 583 (1947).  This 
would suggest another, quite different, public policy rationale for non-enforcement of 
slave contracts, where the purchase price was likely to be paid out of the labor of the 
enslaved person, which is no longer available to satisfy the debt. 
84 1869 WL 5419 at *2.  The intra-family sale of slaves was a common transaction, 
accounting (for example) for 40% of the slaves included in decedents’ estates in the state 
of Maryland from 1831-1844.  Kull, supra note 4, footnote 127 therein and 
accompanying text. 
85 Id. *2.  Genealogical research discloses the biographical details for several individuals 
named “Dudley Roundtree” and “Turner Roundtree,” most of whom appear to be related 
to one another.  Revolutionary War pension records, as presented on www.rootsweb.com, 
disclose the existence of a Dudley Roundtree of Hart County, Kentucky, born in 1768, 
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December 31, 1834.86 Upon receipt of this writing, Dudley turned Eliza over to Turner, 
who returned with her to Illinois.87 The opinion does not tell us whether Turner made 
any of the promised payments, but we can infer that he did not make all of them.   
By the time the case was litigated, decades after the contract, both Dudley and 
Turner were dead, though Eliza still lived.  The suit began when the administrator of 
Dudley’s estate came to Illinois to force Turner’s administrator to satisfy what remained 
 
who provided testimony in 1832 about his relatives’ service in the Revolution.  The same 
website identifies Nathaniel Roundtree, born 1760, as Dudley’s brother, and a son of 
Nathaniel named Turner.  However, the case describes Dudley and Turner as “cousins,” 
rather than uncle and nephew. See http://www.rootsweb.com/~kyhart/pensions_records_ 
of_soldiers.htm. A different family tree website contains a Dudley Roundtree (whose 
father was also named Dudley), with a brother named Nathaniel born in 1760, “born ABT 
[about] 1767 in Cumberland Co., VA, and died 29 Nov 1839. He married Martha Allen 
Richardson 6 May 1790 in Woodford Co., KY, daughter of Turner Richardson and Anne 
Allen,” which may account for the use of “Turner” as a given name.  See 
http://worldconnect.rootsweb.com/cgi-bin/igm.cgi?op= AHN&db=doigk&id=I2767.
Another genealogy website contains a listing for a “Turner Rountree” (note variant 
spelling), born about 1816 in an unnamed location, whose several older siblings were 
born in Kentucky and several younger siblings in Illinois, presumably when the family 
moved, but he would be too young for an 1833 transaction. See 
http://awt.ancestry.com/cgi-in/igm.cgi?op=AHN&db=:2919173&id=I15988&ti=4317.
86 1869 WL 5419 at *2. 
87 Id. at *2. 
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of Turner’s debt to Dudley.88 Marvin Baker, Turner’s administrator, pleaded nil debet,89 
and specifically, failure of consideration, because the contract purported to sell a free 
person.90 Baker prevailed in a bench trial in February, 1869, succeeding in avoiding the 
debt.  This outcome was appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, where Dudley’s 
administrator obtained a reversal, in an opinion by Kentucky-born Justice Pinckney 
 
88 Under both 19th century and current law, claims against a decedent or decedent’s estate 
must typically be presented to the court probating the decedent’s estate.  Because Turner 
died owning property in Illinois, his estate would be probated by the appropriate Illinois 
court. 755 Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/5-1, formerly governed by R.L. 1829, p. 197, § 
17; R.L. 1833, p. 616, § 17; R.S. 1845, p. 540, § 17 (and subsequent revisions and 
recodifications). 
89 “Nil debet,” Latin for “he owes nothing,” is a general denial in a common law debt 
action on a simple contract. “The proper general issue in debt on simple contracts and 
statutes is ‘nil debet,’ which is a formal denial of the debt.  It denies not only the 
existence of any contract, but under it any matters in excuse or in discharge may also be 
shown.” Benjamin J. Shipman, Handbook of Common-Law Pleading § 184, at 327 
(Henry Winthrop Ballantine ed., 3d ed. 1923). Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). 
90 Today, we might regard such a contract as void for illegality, rather than failure of 
consideration, which has fallen into disuse.  There was an additional statute of limitations 
issue pleaded, but the court concluded that the applicable statute of limitations, sixteen 
years, was met, presumably because suit was filed less than sixteen years after the first 
missed payment, or less than sixteen years after the final payment was due (December 31, 
1854).  1869 WL 5419 at *2. 
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Walker (another Lockwood apprentice).91 The court which, a decade before, had 
described slavery as “repugnant to our law and the policy of our institutions,”92 and had 
stated expressly that “our courts will not enforce, as a general rule, the laws of other 
States recognizing this species of property, where the cause of action, based upon such 
laws, arises in this State,”93 then proceeded to enforce a contract made in Kentucky, 
 
91 Walker’s official biography provides as follows: “Pinckney H. Walker was born on 
June 18, 1815, in Adair County, Kentucky. He moved from Kentucky to Rushville, 
Illinois, where he clerked in a store for four years. He studied law in the office of his 
uncle, Cyrus Walker, and was admitted to the bar in 1839 by Justices Lockwood and 
Browne. He practiced law in Macomb, Illinois, until 1848, when he returned to Rushville. 
Walker continued to practice law, and in 1853, he was elected judge of the Fifth Judicial 
Circuit, which was composed of Schuyler, Pike, Brown, McDonough, Cass, and Mason 
counties. He resigned from this position in 1858 after accepting an appointment to fill a 
vacancy on the Illinois Supreme Court, replacing Onias C. Skinner. From 1864 - 1867 
and again in 1874 and 1879, Walker served as the chief justice of the court. Walker was 
reelected to the supreme court three times and held his position on the bench until his 
death on February 7, 1885, in Rushville, Illinois, having served on the court for twenty-
seven years.”  See http://www2.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Previous/Bio_Walker.asp.
92 1857 WL 5640 at *2. 
93 Id. at *3. 
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between a Kentuckian and an Illinois citizen, for the purchase and sale of an enslaved 
human being.  And all this took place four years after the Civil War!94 
How? And why?  First, the “how.”  It is possible, by a certain effort, to analyze 
this agreement without considering its subject matter more than fleetingly, simply by 
treating it as a Kentucky contract, fully enforceable under Kentucky law when made, 
fully performed by Dudley, and hence enforceable by him (or his representative) in an 
action brought in any U.S. state within the applicable statute of limitations.  This would 
be so even though, in 1869, such a contract newly made would not be enforceable even in 
Kentucky.  As the court says, “Under the laws of Kentucky the sale [of Eliza] was 
authorized, and there was a sufficient consideration.”95 The court might have echoed 
 
94 Roundtree is discussed by Paulsen and Sovern, supra note 27, who state, “The idea that 
a court will enforce such a contract as long as it can keep from turning itself into a flesh 
market also found acceptance in the Supreme Court of Illinois in a suit to recover on a 
note given for the price of a slave [Roundtree v. Baker].  Relief was granted even though 
Illinois had abolished slavery long before the sale in Kentucky took place and even 
though the Civil War and the abolition of slavery had intervened between the time of the 
transaction and suit.  The court indicated its abhorrence of slavery, stating that it would 
not specifically enforce such a contract but that, since the slave had been delivered, it 
would enforce payment of a note given for him.”  Id. at 972-973.  They do not comment 
further, other than to remark that “it is curious that the sensibilities of the judiciary have 
been offended in cases involving far less egregious violations.”  Id. at 973.  Roundtree is 
also mentioned in Kull, supra note 4, at 516.   
95 1869 WL 5419 at *4. 
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Lockwood in Nance v. Howard from four decades earlier, and held that enforcement of 
this agreement “is a question of mere dry law, and does not involve in its investigation 
and decision, any thing relative to the humanity, policy, or legality of the laws and 
constitution”96 of Illinois as they relate to slavery.  As one commentator aptly 
summarizes, “The legal foundation of the enforcement of a debt, after all, was not the law 
of slavery but the law of contracts.”97 
Enforcement on this rationale, if disappointing, would not be completely 
surprising, though it would be simple-minded after Hone and Rodney. The “public 
policy” issue demands attention, hardly less after the Civil War than before.  For a proper 
nineteenth-century jurist employing a proper comity-based approach, the inquiry must 
address whether the public policy of Illinois, in 1869, militates against the enforcement of 
this Kentucky agreement – and on that question, Rodney and Hone seem clearly to 
answer in the affirmative.  How does the Roundtree court avoid this result? 
First, it should be said, not by using the mechanisms that a contemporary jurist 
would – identifying Kentucky as the state with the “most significant relationship” to the 
contract, and applying Kentucky law (whatever that might be in a post-bellum 
environment with respect to contracts of this kind).  Applying today’s choice of law rules, 
it is not difficult, as a technical matter, to distinguish this case from Hone or Rodney. The 
Illinois court could reason that this claim falls outside Rodney’s refusal to grant recovery 
for causes of action based on property rights in slaves, because it did not “arise in this 
 
96 1828 WL 1651 at *2. 
97 Kull, supra note 4, at 514. 
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State,”98 but rather, in Kentucky.  The contract itself was entered into in Kentucky, a 
slave state, and the “consideration,” Eliza, was located there at that time.  Dudley 
performed in Kentucky, and Turner gave his promise there.  We might also think of 
Turner as having failed to perform there, where the promised consideration ($20 
annually) failed to arrive.  Another contact with Kentucky is that the injury resulting from 
Turner’s breach was suffered there, where Dudley resided.  In a Restatement (Second) 
jurisdiction like today’s Illinois, these factors warrant the application of Kentucky law, 
not Illinois law, to the dispute.99 Interestingly, however, even if we were to apply a 
Second Restatement approach, the “public policy” exception is still available, as it has 
 
98 1857 WL 5640 at *3. 
99 Today Illinois takes a Restatement (Second) approach to resolving disputes based on 
contractual rights where the contract has connections with more than one state and the 
parties have not made an explicit and effective choice of law.  Illinois Tool Works v. 
Sierracin Corp., 134 Ill.App.3d 63, 89 Ill.Dec. 40, 479 N.E.2d 1046 (1985); Champagnie 
v. W.E. O’Neil Construction Co., 77 Ill.App.3d 136, 32 Ill.Dec. 609, 395 N.E.2d 990 
(1979); accord Palmer v. Beverly Enterprises, 823 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1987).  As it 
happens, Kentucky is also a Restatement (Second) jurisdiction for contracts conflicts of 
law.  Lewis v. American Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579 (1977) (adopting 
Restatement (Second) for contracts conflicts of law). 
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survived the transition from nineteenth- and early twentieth-century approaches to the 
Second Restatement in many states, including Illinois.100 Plus ça change…  
In any event, the clash between the Kentucky contract and the public policy of 
Illinois as it relates to slavery is unavoidable.  Here is what the Roundtree court says: 
Our courts would not enforce a contract for the sale of a slave, whether 
made in this State, where slavery has always been prohibited, or in a State 
where such contracts are binding, because it is against public policy.  But 
after the parties have fully executed their contract, and a note is given for 
the price, the note may be collected, and it is not for us, from caprice, or 
because we may abhor the system of slavery and the sale of human beings, 
to refuse to lend the aid of the courts for the collection of the money.  It is 
not against the policy of our State to allow its collection, nor is it contrary 
to the interests of our citizens.101 
The passage begins, “Our courts would not enforce a contract for the sale of a 
slave.”  This cannot mean simply that the Illinois court would not order a defendant under 
the jurisdiction of the Illinois court to deliver to a plaintiff who has paid consideration, a 
human being to be enslaved.  After the unequivocal abolition of slavery in every U.S. 
state, such a result in unavoidable, and indeed, would hardly have raised an eyebrow in 
Illinois, even before the war – notwithstanding Nance v. Howard – given Hone and 
 
100 Resorts International, Inc. v. Zonis, 577 F.Supp. 876 (N.D.Ill. 1984) (refusing to 
enforce a gambling debt validly contracted in New Jersey); see also Corr, supra note 18, 
at 676-77.    
101 1869 WL 5419 at *4. 
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Rodney. By 1869, of course, such a contract, wherever made, would be unenforceable 
not because it was in some inchoate way “against public policy,” but because enforcing it 
in those terms would violate the U.S. Constitution (and the Illinois Constitution as 
well).102 That agreement would be – in 1869 – illegal everywhere, and no “public policy 
exception” would need to be invoked to deny it enforcement.   
But for this antebellum agreement, Justice Walker sidesteps the problem, 
employing a hypertechnical distinction to separate what is impermissible – “the sale of a 
slave” – from what is apparently perfectly all right – “the collection of the money.”  The 
court somehow distinguished between enforcing the contract, which it would not do, and 
 
102 The Emancipation Proclamation took effect on January 1, 1863, but was not legally 
ratified and given effect as the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution until December 
18, 1865.  The Thirteenth Amendment provides as follows:  
“Section 1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or 
any place subject to their jurisdiction.  
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”  
The 14th Amendment provides in relevant part, “Section 1.  [N]o State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws….Section 5.  The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article.”  The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified and took effect in 
1868. 
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enforcing the note, which it did – an exceedingly formal distinction, at best.103 Note the 
striking and unusual non-mutuality of remedy – had Turner fully performed (by paying), 
and Dudley not done so, ordering the delivery of Eliza into slavery across state lines in 
1869 would have been in every sense impossible.  The only remedy for that situation, 
presumably, would have been disgorgement by Dudley’s administrator on an unjust 
enrichment theory (perhaps with interest at the legal rate).  In that situation, giving the 
parties the full benefit of their bargain, by judicial intervention, after the abolition of 
slavery, was simply impossible – the only option would be to approximate the pre-
contracting status quo.  Here, though, if Turner (or, more properly, Turner’s estate) is not 
made to pay, he will have enjoyed the benefit of Eliza’s bound labor for approximately 
thirty years without paying anyone for it – the sort of “windfall” a court is unlikely to let 
lie.   
The opinion continues, “it is not for us, from caprice, or because we may abhor 
the system of slavery and the sale of human beings, to refuse”104 enforcement.  Note how 
the grammar of the opinion equates the two – mere “caprice,” on the one hand, and 
“abhor[rence of] the system of slavery and the sale of human beings,”105 on the other – as 
 
103 As Kull remarks with equanimity in a similar context, “Such answers may seem 
lawyerly and literal-minded, oblivious to the moral issues that many saw in the question.  
In traditional legal terms, however – the terms in which the challenge to enforcement was 
posed by the arguments… – the judges’ response was both accurate and cogent.”  Kull, 
supra note 4, at 516.
104 1869 WL 5419 at *4. 
105 Id. at *4.  
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if the latter is no better a reason to refuse enforcement of a contract than the former, or 
worse still, as if the latter were merely a species of the former – and almost, in fact, as if 
there were no such thing as the public policy exception at all.   
It is the Nance v. Howard move all over again – by deliberately abstracting from 
the real issue, what remains is nothing but a “question of mere dry law, [which] does not 
involve in its investigation and decision, any thing relative to the humanity, policy, or 
legality of the laws and constitution”106 of Illinois as they relate to “the system of slavery 
and the sale of human beings.”107 And this maneuver succeeds in framing the later 
reception of the case.  Miller v. Wilson, an Illinois case decided in 1893, cites Roundtree 
for the uncontroversial principle that “a contract valid in the state where it is executed 
may be enforced in another state,”108 in the comparatively innocuous context of a real 
property conveyance that satisfied the Kansas, but not the Illinois, statute of frauds. 
Where is the Illinois court of the 1850s, unwilling to permit itself to be used to 
provide legal support for treating any human being as someone else’s property?  In 1852, 
Hone’s attempt to collect on Ammons’ promise to pay for the man who was “walking 
abroad as free as Hone himself”109 met with failure.  Rodney, the Missouri slave-holder 
chasing after the fugitive Joseph and hoping to recover the value of his lost services from 
the Illinois railroad that carried the slave to freedom, encountered the near-derision of the 
Illinois court in 1857.  By 1869, that same court seemed willing to bend over backwards 
 
106 1828 WL 1651 at *2. 
107 1869 WL 5419 at *4. 
108 Miller v. Wilson, 146 Ill. 523, 529, 34 N.E. 1111, 1113 (Ill. 1893). 
109 1869 WL 5419 at *1. 
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to ensure that the heirs of a dead slave-seller collected full value on an agreement 
probably ignored for a decade or more, with both contracting parties dead and slavery 
abolished everywhere in the U.S.  That result required a labored, hyper-technical 
distinction – between what it called “a contract for the sale of a slave,”110 and “a 
note…given for the price”111 of that slave.   
It may be hard to see a “third way” out of this dilemma – either Dudley’s heirs 
collect on a contract for the sale of a human being years after slavery, or Turner gets 
away with “stealing” from his cousin by taking years of Eliza’s labor without paying for 
it.  The case is different from Hone and Roundtree, because in each of those cases, the 
person whose future labor is at issue is legally, presumptively, a free person.112 The court 
holds that Ammons is not obligated to pay Hone, because Hone cannot deliver the 
unnamed man’s future labor to Ammons – the man is in Illinois, and he belongs only to 
himself.  The court denies Rodney a recovery against the railroad, where any such 
recovery is again premised on Rodney’s loss of Joseph’s future labor – for Joseph is in 
Illinois, where he is a free man who owns himself.  But in Roundtree, Eliza’s labor has 
already been performed.  The vendee, the late Turner Roundtree, is hardly sympathetic – 
 
110 Id. at *4. 
111 Id. at *4. 
112 And, it should be noted, a man.  Although the cases have no overtly gendered legal 
dimension, it is worth mentioning at least in passing that the formerly enslaved persons 
whose free status is vindicated are men (Joseph and the man in Hone), and are presented 
in an autonomous and almost heroic light as having successfully escaped slavery, while 
the bondage of the women Nance and Eliza is tolerated if not endorsed by the court.  
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he did not buy Eliza to free her, after all – and we can feel the dilemma of the court 
forced to choose the lesser of these two evils.  Eliza is free now.  What else is there to do?  
Turner has received the benefit of his bargain, at least for his own lifetime.  Doesn’t 
justice demand that his estate pay for what he received?  
It does.  But there is a way out of this conundrum, a way to prevent the unjust 
enrichment of Turner’s estate, without recognizing Dudley’s property right in Eliza 
(though I readily grant that it is not an approach that would have occurred to Justice 
Walker).   
That approach is to order Turner’s estate to pay Eliza either on the contract, or for 
the value of her labor (plus interest) for all those years.   
This remedy satisfies an even more fundamental and obvious demand of justice 
than that Turner’s estate pay for what Turner received (though that demand is satisfied as 
well).  Surely Eliza herself is more entitled to the price of her labor than the heirs of a 
dead slave-dealer?  Those heirs may be “innocent” enough – but surely not more so than 
Eliza herself.  Legally and morally, it may not be possible to compensate her for the 
denial of her liberty – but the law knows how to value expropriated labor.113 It is not 
enough to claim to “abhor the system of slavery and the sale of human beings,”114 while 
 
113 This is not, of course, to suggest that the contract price, with interest, would in any 
sense fully compensate her.  The injury she has suffered goes far beyond lost “wages,” 
and may well encompass, for example, her sexual misuse since girlhood.  If there is any 
situation in which the metaphor of “making a party whole” is tragically inapposite, it is 
surely here.  Still, at the very least she is entitled to the market value of her labor. 
114 1869 WL 5419 at *4. 
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neglecting this perhaps unique opportunity for the Illinois court to quite literally “put its 
money where its mouth is.” 115 In so doing, the court would have retroactively denied the 
legal reality of the slave relationship, the idea that the surviving Eliza was ever, in the 
eyes of the Illinois court, the property of another.  That is what the court might have 
done, to hold Turner to his promise without validating the contract.116 
One other alternative should be mentioned here: total “annihilation” of the 
contracts, a blanket refusal by the courts to take cognizance of the disputes.  In principle, 
dismissal or denial of all enforcement claims might seem the “purest” anti-slavery 
position. 117 As one contemporary put it, “If these debts are recognized, it is a recognition 
 
115 This same structure – strong condemnatory rhetoric about slavery, resting atop a 
decision validating a slave contract – reappears in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Osborn v Nicholson, 80 U.S. 654 (1871), discussed infra, in which the Reconstruction-
era Court holds a slave buyer to his debt while purporting to acknowledge “[t]he 
atrocious traffic in human beings, torn from their country to be transported to hopeless 
bondage in other lands, known as the slave trade.”  80 U.S. at 661.  
116 This also avoids the dilemma identified by Kull, as to whether it is correct that 
“contractual performance was not dependent on the continued existence of slavery,” or 
rather, would “the enforcement of a slave debt somehow impl[y] the permanence of the 
institution”?  Kull, supra note 4, at 502.  Payment to Eliza is a form of contractual 
performance that not only does not imply the future existence of the institution, but 
actually casts doubt on its prior existence as a legally-sanctioned arrangement. 
117 Some “radicals” did argue, after abolition, “that such disputes were [no] longer 
cognizable by the courts.”  Kull, supra note 4, at 512.  Kull describes this as “deny[ing] 
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of that institution, of its propriety, its justice and morality.”118 The problem is that non-
recognition does not so much deny the institution, as simply shift the loss from buyer to 
seller.119 
Paying Eliza goes non-recognition one better:  if the buyer is forced to pay, but 
the seller is unable to collect, both suffer a legal penalty – one for attempting to sell a 
person who could not rightfully belong to him, and the other for attempting to buy 
someone who ought not to have been reduced to a chattel at all.  Moreover, it more fully 
implements or expresses the “radical” view, occasionally articulated in the 
Reconstructionist period, “that denied the legality of slavery, even where slavery was 
recognized by positive law.”120 It was a commonplace in the abolitionist analysis to state 
that slavery existed only by “positive law”; the more radical position politically, and in a 
sense even metaphysically, questioned its existence even then.121 This is the issue raised 
 
that justice between the buyers and sellers of slaves could ever again be a concern of the 
courts.” Id.
118 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of South Carolina 51 (1868), in Kull, 
supra note 4, at 515. 
119 The political dynamics of favoring debtors over creditors in slave transactions, and 
hence favoring “debt relief” through non-enforcement, are explored in Kull, supra note 4, 
at 522-530.  
120 Kull, supra note 4, at 517. 
121 The metaphysical problem posed by slavery, illuminated first by Adrienne Davis, 
“The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective,” 51 Stan. L. Rev. 221 
(1999), supra note 45, is simply this: the Anglo-American ontology of property law 
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in the nineteenth century as whether there can be “any right of property in man.”122 To 
pay Eliza does more than prohibiting of enforcement, or non-recognition, can do to “deny 
that any human being was ever a chattel or a slave.”123 
The idea of paying Eliza is suggested only half-seriously, of course, as a sort of 
legal Gedankenexperiment or scientifico-legal fiction, a picture of an alternate reality no 
more genuinely imaginable in 1869 than cell phones and the Internet.  But the fact that 
the suggestion is surprising or strange is evidence of how thoroughly effaced Eliza is, 
even from a case in which she is at least named (unlike the “man” in Hone).  One way to 
give meaning to the claim that there is no “right of property in [wo]man” is to take her 
 
divides everything that is, into a potential property-owner, or a potential item of property.  
Human chattel slavery posits, in essence, that someone might lie on both sides of this 
divide.  Davis explores this in the context of conflicts arising from inheritance by, and of,
enslaved persons.  The opinion of Reconstruction-era Judge Caldwell, with perhaps more 
imagination than sensitivity to the niceties of statutes of limitations, voir dire, and other 
matters of procedure, conjures up the truly ghastly spectacle of a trial on a “breach of 
warranty” defense in a suit on a slave contract, in which the buyer alleges the slave was 
not sound in mind and body,” in which “it may chance that the subject of this inquiry is a 
juror or officer of the court, and indeed it might occur that the judge on the bench would 
be the subject of such an inquiry.”  Osborn v. Nicholson, 18 F.Cas. 846, 855 (E.D.Ark. 
1870).  
122 South Carolina Constitutional Convention, supra note 114, at 225. 
123 Robert DeLarge, South Carolina Constitutional Convention, supra note 114 (emphasis 
added), at 915, quoted in Kull, supra note 4, at 520. 
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seriously, not merely as the subject-matter of the contract, nor precisely as a party to the 
dispute, but as a person with legal interests very much at stake here.  She was, as it were, 
the “third party detrimentary” of the contract in question – the one from whom 
consideration passed (her labor, and her liberty) but to whom no benefit flowed – and she 
has suffered a legal injury (apart from every other sort of injury) entitling her to a legal 
remedy.    
It is surprisingly easy to lose sight of this perspective (or never to have noticed it 
at all).  Professor Kull explains that denial of enforcement “pushed back the effective 
date of emancipation as between these buyers and these sellers, denying to the seller the 
fruit of his favorable bargain and relieving the buyer from the consequences of his 
unfavorable one.”124 From the seller’s point of view, non-enforcement means 
“emancipation [is] made retroactive.”125 Kull goes so far as to describe “a refusal to 
enforce the note” as “back-dating the effective date of freedom.”126 But nothing has 
changed “the effective date of emancipation” or “freedom” from the enslaved person’s 
point of view!  His or her days of bound labor were in no way diminished by the outcome 
of this litigation.  Kull’s way of putting this point, which is actually about dating, and 
hence allocating, casualty loss (not “freedom”), is both technically correct and a 
reflection of the apparent naturalness of foregrounding the legal (and even moral) claims 
of those trafficking in human beings, rather than the enslaved persons themselves.  
Resisting that analytical temptation, even as we enter into the logic of these nineteenth-
 
124 Kull, supra note 4, at 524. 
125 Kull, supra note 4, at 532. 
126 Kull, supra note 4, at 494. 
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century cases, is difficult, but important, if we are to have any hope of stimulating and 
sensitizing our current legal imagination about dilemmas that seem as intractable to us, as 
the unexecuted slave contract did to them.  
Fully accounting for the Roundtree result is more difficult than trying to learn 
something from it.  There is something here, surely, about interstate relations in the post-
bellum era, in why the Illinois court seems more deferential to Kentucky, or the law of 
Kentucky, after the wounds of the Civil War than before.  Or perhaps with slavery 
officially legally dismantled, and in that sense with little or nothing at stake, the Illinois 
judges meant to act magnanimously, and favor the heir of the slave-seller (the judge’s 
fellow Kentuckian) over his Northern relation?  We are left to speculate. 
 
III. Comity and the Laws of Slavery in Antebellum Illinois 
A better grip on nineteenth century American understandings of the principle of 
“comity” in choice of law helps us to understand what didn’t happen in Roundtree but
might have – why the Illinois Supreme Court declined to employ the “public policy” 
exception to void the Kentucky contract for the purchase and sale of Eliza.   
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed comity and the clash between the laws of 
slaveholding and non-slaveholding states most squarely in relation to an Illinois criminal 
statute, §149 of the criminal code, which prohibited harboring and secreting fugitive 
slaves.  Two cases arosing under this statute, Willard v. People127 and Eells v. People,128 
127 1843 WL 4112 (Ill. 1843), 4 Scam. 461, 5 Ill. 461 (1843). 
128 1843 WL 4117 (Ill. 1843), 4 Scam. 498 (1843). 
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were decided in the winter of 1843.  Both involved slave-holders who voluntarily brought 
enslaved persons with them from a slaveholding state through Illinois en route to a 
destination in another slaveholding state.  The enslaved persons escaped and found 
shelter with Illinois citizens, who were then indicted for violating §149; in subsequent 
proceedings, the constitutionality of that statute was challenged.  Both decisions include 
significant discussions of comity in this context. 
Section 149 of the Illinois criminal code made it a criminal offense to harbor or 
secrete fugitive slaves.129 Such a law obviously depended implicitly on the legal 
recognition of the relationship of master and slave, as one subsisting outside Illinois, but 
arguably requiring recognition of the master’s property rights in the enslaved person even 
within Illinois borders.  Because the Illinois constitution, by its own terms, apparently 
denied recognition of such a relationship and such rights, the constitutionality (under the 
state constitution) of the criminal law was challenged.   
In concurrence in Willard,130 and in dissent in Eells,131 Justice Samuel Lockwood, 
late of Nance v. Howard, articulated as clearly as possible the comity-based rationale not 
only for permitting slaveholders safe passage through the “free” state of Illinois (by not 
deeming their slaves emancipated solely based on bringing them into Illinois), but for 
further securing the slaveholders’ property rights in enslaved persons by criminalizing the 
conduct of Illinois citizens who would assist fugitive slaves in escaping from bondage.  
 
129 (year of enactment) 
130 1843 WL 4112, at *10. 
131 1843 WL 4117, at *13 (dissenting on the basis that the power to legislate on the 
subject of fugitive slaves is vested exclusively in the U.S. Congress). 
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These opinions not only reveal a good deal about the antebellum Illinois judiciary’s 
attitudes toward slaves and slavery, but address the issue precisely in terms of comity. 
In Willard, the Illinois attorney general MacDougall, defending the statute, 
presented the policy basis and goals of interstate comity, on analogy to international 
comity, as applicable specifically in the State of Illinois.  He explained,  
International comity is not the creature of legislation.  It grows out of 
general rules which are observed to advance the general interests and 
convenience of nations; and in this state, as well as the other states of the 
Union, it is the province of the courts of judicature to determine how far 
they will recognise [sic] the laws of other states, and the rights of citizens 
of other states, within our own territory.  In making such determination, it 
is their duty to adopt a large and enlightened policy, which will forward 
and advance a friendly and mutual intercourse between our own state and 
all the sister states of the confederacy; and our position upon the two great 
western rivers, connecting our business with the states of the south, and 
our intermediate location between the states of Kentucky and Missouri, 
furnish special reasons why they should recognise and respect the rights of 
the slave owner, so long as those rights do not interfere with our own 
cherished institutions.132 
132 1843 WL 4112 at *6. 
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Justice Scates,133 born in Virginia and raised in Kentucky, wrote for the Court, 
and characterized the case as one about the right of free passage by citizens of 
slaveholding states (with their slaves) through Illinois.  He stated, 
It would be productive of great and irremediable evils, of discord, of heart 
burnings, and alienation of kind and fraternal feeling, which should 
characterize the American brotherhood, and tend greatly to weaken, if not 
 
133 Scates’ official biography provides as follows:  “Walter B. Scates was born on 
January 18, 1808, in South Boston, Virginia. He moved with his parents to Kentucky in 
1809. In 1831 he moved to Frankfort, Kentucky, and was admitted to the bar in 1833. In 
1836 he moved to Vandalia, Illinois, and in December of that year, the state legislature 
elected him judge of the Third Judicial Circuit. Scates resigned in 1841, when the 
legislature appointed him to the Illinois Supreme Court, after it expanded the court from 
four to nine members. Each of the nine justices presided over a circuit court, and Justice 
Scates was assigned to the Third Judicial Circuit. He resigned from the bench in 1847, 
and moved to Chicago. He served as a delegate to the 1848 Illinois Constitutional 
Convention. Elected to the supreme court in 1853, Scates became chief justice in 1855, 
and resigned from the bench two years later. With the outbreak of the Civil War, Scates 
served in the military, and in 1862, he was commissioned a major on General John A. 
McClernand’s staff, eventually attaining the rank of brigadier-general. Scates declined 
President Lincoln’s offer of the New Mexico Territory governorship. From 1866 to 1869, 
Scates served as collector of customs for the port of Chicago. He resumed the practice of 
law in Chicago in 1870 and continued until his death on October 26, 1886, in Evanston, 
Illinois.”  See http://www2.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Previous/Bio_Scates.asp.
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to destroy the common bond of union amongst us, and our nationality of 
character, interest and feeling [to deny recognition to the property rights of 
slaveholders].  Thousands from Kentucky, Virginia, Maryland, Tennessee 
and the Carolinas, and other southern states have sought and found free 
and safe passage with their slaves across our territory, to and from 
Missouri.  It would be startling, indeed, if we should deny our neighbors 
and kindred that common right of free and safe passage, which foreign 
nations would hardly dare deny.134 
While the Scates majority opinion took the more cautious and technical approach 
of locating the case firmly within the American jurisprudence of fugitive slaves, the 
concurrence by Justice Lockwood, with more intellectual courage (but fewer pangs of 
conscience?) refused this route, and rested the result exclusively on principles of comity.  
For Lockwood, the general background presumption was that everyone in Illinois 
was free, unless that person were covered by the federal fugitive slave laws.  Julia, the 
woman in Willard, was not technically a “fugitive,” because she was brought voluntarily 
into Illinois (she did not escape to Illinois).135 Lockwood applied this analysis 
consistently, dissenting in Eells v. People, decided during the same term (December 
1843), on the basis that the indictment did not contain enough information to determine 
whether the slave in question was in fact a “fugitive” covered by federal law.136 In 
 
134 1843 WL 4112 at *10. 
135 Id. at *10. 
136 Richard Eells v. People, 1843 WL 4117 (Ill.), 4 Scam. 498, 5 Ill. 498 (1843). 
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Willard, Lockwood cited cases making clear that the federal fugitive slave laws therefore 
did not apply,137 and then asked frankly,  
Julia then was not a fugitive from labor, under the constitution of the 
United States and the law of congress, and being brought into this state by 
her mistress, where the presumption is in favor of her freedom, the 
question arises what takes her case out of the operation of this general 
rule?138 
Using the same rhetorical strategy employed in Nance,139 Lockwood again asked 
and answered this difficult but logical question (at least to his own satisfaction).   
The answer is that her case is taken out of the operation of the general rule 
by the law of comity….[T]he courts of this state have the power 
independent of legislature [sic] enactment, under the law of comity, and in 
the exercise of a sound discretion, of determining what laws of other states 
shall be recognised and enforced in this.140 
137 1843 WL 4112 at *10-11. 
138 Id. at *11. 
139 Recall that in Nance, Lockwood had asked, “Are then registered servants, goods or 
chattels, within the meaning of the [1825] statute [providing for the seizure and sale on 
execution]?” and answered it affirmatively.  1828 WL 1651 at *2. 
140 1843 WL 4112 at *11. 
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The question is then whether this is such a situation, noting that “regard should be 
had to the geographical position of Illinois, as well as to the relations we sustain to our 
sister states, confederated under the same general government.”141 
Illinois occupied a unique geographical position, because overland travel between 
the slave states of Kentucky and Missouri passed through it.142 Lockwood 
unapologetically pointed to the commercial advantages for Illinois of being the primary 
route for settlers on their way westward from Kentucky to Missouri:  “While this free 
passage through the state; with their slaves, recognized as property in the states whence 
they emigrated, has been of great convenience to the slaveholding states, it has not been 
without its advantages to our own state.”143 He also made a sort of reliance argument, on 
behalf of citizens of those slaveholding states:  “[I]f, after having permitted them this 
privilege for the last thirty years, we were now to deny it, could they not justly charge us 
with having availed ourselves of our local position to do them a serious and unnecessary 
injury?”144 
He summarized,  
The facts growing out of our geographical position, the past relations 
subsisting between this and neighboring states, the inconveniences to 
which we would subject them by a change of these relations, the loss of 
 
141 Id. at *11. 
142 Id. at *12. 
143 Id. at *12. 
144 Id. at *12. 
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benefits to ourselves following a change of these relations, are such as 
appeal strongly to the discretion of this court.145 
He also emphasized that the reasons for extending comity here were much 
stronger than in the case of relations with foreign nations.  The opinion is worth quoting 
at some length, for what it reveals about Lockwood’s thought processes.   
The relations we sustain to our sister states also furnish strong reasons 
why the law of comity should be expanded, so as to meet the exigencies 
arising out of that relation….They are not foreign states.  We are bound up 
with them by the constitution of the United States into a Union, upon the 
preservation of which no one can doubt that our own peace and welfare 
greatly depend.  Other nations may cherish friendly relations with each 
other, and endeavor to promote alliances and frequent intercourse, from 
fear of foreign war, or a desire of commercial prosperity.  But to us these 
relations and this intercourse have a value and importance which are 
inestimable.  They are the grounds of safety for our domestic peace, and 
for our hopes of the continuation of the happy government under which 
we live.  What injures one state injures the others.  It is consequently our 
duty to consult the good of all the states, and so frame and administer our 
laws, that we give our sister states no real cause of offence.  We ought to 
do them all the kind offices in our power, consistently with our duty to 
ourselves.  Thus will be produced that concord, that union of affection, 
and interest among the states, which may prove an enduring cement to that 
 
145 1843 WL 4112 at *12. 
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happy and glorious union, upon the continuation of which our hopes of 
domestic peace and rational freedom so eminently depend.146 
Note certain features of his reasoning, articulated here two decades before the 
Civil War.  We know, with the benefit of hindsight, that the endless uneasy legal and 
political compromises between slaveholding and nonslaveholding states failed utterly to 
produce an “enduring cement” for the Union.  But Lockwood’s words (and Scates’ as 
well) convey a palpable sense of the fragility of the Union, together with a felt need to 
appease the slaveholding states to preserve it.  Never does Lockwood seem to consider 
that by using Illinois for the transportation of enslaved persons, citizens of those 
slaveholding states might be in some way injuring or offending the citizens of Illinois, to 
say nothing of the clear exclusion of enslaved Americans or their recently-emancipated 
kind from the class of those who share “our hopes” of so-called “rational freedom.”   
He continued, 
By the law of nations, it would be considered just cause of complaint, if 
we should arbitrarily refuse to the citizens of foreign nations at peace with 
us permission to pass through our territories, with their property.  If this be 
so, as regards the citizens of foreign nations, how much greater propriety 
does there exist that we should extend this boon, if boon it be, to our 
fellow citizens, who are also our friends, our neighbors and our relations.  
That our denial to the people of our sister states to have the right of 
passage for themselves and their slaves would inflict on them a most 
 
146 Id. at *12. 
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serious injury cannot be doubted.147 The bitterness which usually 
characterizes border animosities admonishes us of the propriety of 
cultivating, by every just means in our power, that social intercourse with 
our neighbors which will be productive of mutual esteem and good will.  
Should we refuse them the privilege of taking their slaves through our 
state, would there not be danger that such refusal would engender feelings 
on their part not favorable to a continuance of our happy Union?  Are 
there reasons of sufficient magnitude to induce us to risk such 
consequences?  I think not.  Our interest, our duty, our love to our whole 
country, conspire to prove the propriety of allowing our fellow citizens of 
our sister states the right to travel through this state, either as emigrants or 
travelers, with their slaves, unless serious injury will result to ourselves by 
 
147 As a matter of overland travel, that is probably correct.  The Trail of Tears (1838-
1839) route, traversed roughly at the same time as these cases were decided, is described 
as follows: “The northern route started at Calhoun, Tennessee, and crossed central 
Tennessee, southwestern Kentucky, and southern Illinois. After crossing the Mississippi 
River north of Cape Girardeau, Missouri, these detachments trekked across southern 
Missouri and the northwest corner of Arkansas.”  
http://www.nps.gov/fosm/history/5tribes/tot/nunahidunadlohilui.htm. National Park 
Service, U.S. Dept. of Interior.  Hence, the route from Kentucky to Missouri passed 
through Illinois.  Assuming the Trail of Tears covered the most-traveled route, the most-
used Mississippi crossing was in southern Illinois.  To avoid Illinois is, however, 
theoretically possible, because Kentucky and Missouri have a common border. – Author. 
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giving such permission.  How injury can result to the people of this state, 
by such a permission, I am entirely at a loss to conceive.  On the contrary 
it might be shown, that, in many instances, it was to their decided 
advantage.148 
The exclusion of persons of African descent, formerly enslaved or otherwise, 
from Lockwood’s understanding of who constitutes “the people of this state,” is nearly 
total.  Were that not so, perhaps he would not be “entirely at a loss to conceive” how 
persons of color, as well as others opposed to the institution of slavery, might be 
“injured” (offended, outraged) not only by being forced to witness, and not interfere with, 
the transportation of enslaved persons through their home state, but in being criminally 
prosecuted by their own state government (under a state constitution prohibiting slavery) 
for helping those who try to escape their bondage.  Given the provisions of the Illinois 
Constitution, moreover, a refusal to allow slaveholders to pass through Illinois with their 
slaves can hardly be considered “arbitrary.” 
Perhaps Lockwood would have done better to recognize that persons of color, 
from Illinois and elsewhere – and not only white slave-owning Southerners – are properly 
included among “our fellow citizens, who are also our friends, our neighbors, and our 
relations.”  And had Lockwood a larger moral imagination, perhaps he would have seen 
that, just as “[w]hat injures one state injures the others,”149 what injures one group of 
citizens, injures the others – and that enslaved persons who are citizens of a state, rather 
than out-of-staters who would enslave them and others like them, are the ones most 
 
148 1843 WL 4112 at *13. 
149 Id. at *12. 
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entitled to expect the “good offices” of (at least!) those states that have seen fit to abolish 
slavery. 
 Lockwood even suggested, it is hard to know how seriously, that a refusal of 
comity – that is, a refusal to recognize and protect the slaveholders’ “property” rights in 
the enslaved persons they bring voluntarily into and through a state that does not 
recognize such property or such relationships among its own domiciliaries – would not 
benefit the enslaved persons, either.   
In considering this question it may be well also to enquire what effect our 
refusal would have upon the slave himself.  Would such refusal be 
injurious or beneficial to him?  It would not certainly tend in the slightest 
degree to emancipate him, nor would it lighten his burdens.  It would not 
prevent the master from emigrating or journeying.  The master could still 
remove him to Missouri by taking a circuitous and tedious route to that 
state,150 without passing through our state, and merely subjecting the slave 
to a long and toilsome journey, probably on foot.  Our refusal, then, would 
seriously injure the master, and not less seriously the slave.  If, then, to 
grant to the citizens of slaveholding states the right of passage through our 
state, with their slaves, will benefit both the master and the slave, and not 
injure us, what possible objection can there be to extending this privilege 
to them?151 
150 Through Tennessee, Arkansas, and then north to Missouri – Author. 
151 1843 WL 4112 at *13. 
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It is hard to know how to respond to an argument put so frankly, if somewhat 
disingenuously.  Safe (and efficient) passage from Eastern and Southern slaveholding 
states, to Western ones, through (where necessary) such non-slaveholding states as 
Illinois, was obviously absolutely essential to the plan to extend slavery to the 
southwestern part of the United States.  Any legal obstacles that made such transportation 
more difficult, more expensive, and more risky, discouraged the importation of slaves to 
those Western states, and undermined the slaveholding culture there, while supporting the 
growth of paid labor. And as for the “burdens” on the enslaved person, the relevant 
question is not whether he or she would prefer to travel on foot from Kentucky to 
Missouri through Illinois, or rather to take a longer route through Tennessee and 
Arkansas.  Rather, the question is whether the enslaved person whose best hope of 
freedom lay in an escape to a non-slaveholding state, would prefer that those who might 
otherwise offer him or her shelter not be discouraged from doing so by the threat of 
criminal penalties.  It is hard to imagine an enslaved person being indifferent on this 
question – or indeed, on any matter that tends to secure and enlarge, or on the other hand 
diminish and undermine, the purported property rights of another person in him or her. 
In characterizing the matter as one calling for “the discretion of this court,”152 
Lockwood seemed almost to mean not ordinary judicial discretion, a choice among 
equally-permitted options based on various policy concerns, but rather that way of being 
“discreet” which consists, as the Oxford English Dictionary puts it, in being “silent when 
speech would be inconvenient.”153 In the name of peace and harmonious relations among 
 
152 Id. at *12. 
153 OED (2nd ed.), Vol. IV, p. 755, col. 1. 
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sister states, the Illinois court avoids “inconveniently” drawing attention to the outrage 
being perpetrated upon the free citizens, black and white, of Illinois.  Even in justifying 
the outcome, Lockwood was unflinching in acknowledging that only considerations of 
the most cynical and craven political type can possibly warrant it. 
IV. Comity in the Post-Bellum World, and The Road Not Taken: Albert’s Tale 
The paradox of Roundtree, in which the highest court of a non-slaveholding state 
used comity to vindicate a slave contract after the Civil War, is only heightened by the 
contemporaneous spectacle of a former slaveholding state’s federal district court refusing 
to enforce such a contract on the basis of the 13th amendment154 – introduced, as the 
reader may recall, by Judge Trumbull of the Hone panel – only to find itself reversed a 
year later by the U.S. Supreme Court.155 
On March 28, 1861, in Arkansas, Young A. G. Nicholson entered into a $1300 
contract with Henry Osborn for the purchase of an enslaved twenty-three year old man 
named Albert.156 Payment was due nine months later, “with interest at the rate of ten per 
cent. from date.”157 The Civil War began just two weeks later, on April 12, 1861, 
 
154 Osborn v. Nicholson, 18 F.Cas. 846 (E.D.Ark. 1870).  
155 Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 654 (1871). 
156 18 F.Cas. at 846.  Southern “debt relief” policies favoring non-enforcement of slave 
contracts were typically aimed at transactions like this, made on the very eve of the war.  
Contrast the 1833 transaction at issue in Roundtree, discussed supra at II.4. 
157 Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. at 655. 
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although South Carolina had actually seceded from the Union the year before.158 
Arkansas seceded shortly after South Carolina, on May 6, 1861.159 Albert was delivered 
to Nicholson, but before Nicholson paid Osborn, “on the 1st day of January, 1862, 
[Albert] was liberated by the United States government,”160 and, having lost the benefit 
of Albert’s services, Nicholson was hardly inclined to pay on the contract.  After the war, 
Osborn sued.161 The factual resemblance to Roundtree is, of course, unmistakable, 
though the lapse of time between sale and emancipation dramatically shorter.  
 
158 The American Civil War began on April 12, 1861 with the firing on Fort Sumter, and 
ended with the Confederate surrender at Appomattox Court House in early April 1865. 
South Carolina, the first state to leave the Union, seceded in 1860, prompted by the 
election of the Republican presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln.  Six more followed 
in early 1861 (Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas), and 
together they formed the Confederate States of America.  President Lincoln took the oath 
of office on March 4, 1861 and sought to maintain ties with eight border states that 
remained with the Union. The Civil War began on April 12 with the firing on Fort 
Sumter by Confederate troops off the coast of Charleston, South Carolina. Four more 
states seceded after war was declared: Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and 
Tennessee. http://www.tea.state.tx.us/ssc/teks_and_taas/teks/glossdate.htm 
159 Id.
160 80 U.S. at 655.  Abraham Lincoln delivered the Emancipation Proclamation on 
September 22, 1862, and it took effect on January 1, 1863. 
161 In thinking about the parties, we do well to heed Kull’s analysis, which reminds us 
that “the most striking fact distinguishing buyers from sellers on the last slave contracts is 
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A. The Federal District Court Closes the Courthouse To Slave-Traders… 
Judge Henry Caldwell,162 of the federal district court,163 readily acknowledged 
that in general, superseding illegality, where the seller had already performed, would not 
relieve the buyer of his obligation to pay on the contract.  As the judge put it, 
On the part of the plaintiff it is claimed that at the date of this contract, 
slaves were property; that they were so recognized by the constitution of 
the United States, and the constitution and laws of this state, where the 
contract was entered into, and that the subsequent abolition of slavery by 
 
that the sellers gave up on slavery before the buyers dId.” Kull, supra note 4, at 530.  
The buyers therefore “speculated upon the success of the rebellion against the United 
States,” Kull at 529, rendering them most unsympathetic to neo-abolitionists, but evoking 
the support of other Southerners.  This is yet one more way in which the question of the 
enforcement of slave contracts is not an ordinary question of commercial law. 
162 As Kull recounts, “Caldwell, a young lawyer and state legislator from Iowa, 
commanded an Iowa cavalry regiment at the capture of Little Rock in September 1863.  
In June 1864, while Caldwell was serving with his regiment in Tennessee, he was 
appointed federal district judge for the District of Arkansas by President Lincoln.”  Kull, 
supra note 4, at 502, and footnote 29 thereto. 
163 Although it is not an issue in this case, it must be that one or the other of the parties 
was not a citizen of Arkansas, as this began as an ordinary contract case and therefore 
could only be in federal court based on diversity.  Nevertheless, this does not come into 
the court’s analysis, probably supporting an inference that both were from slaveholding 
states as of 1861. 
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the thirteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States and the 
provisions of section fourteen, article fifteen of the constitution of this 
state, could not affect the vested rights of the plaintiff under the former 
law.  This is believed to be a full and fair statement of the grounds upon 
which the right of recovery is rested in this class of cases….164 
However, he continued, 
The general rules they lay down with reference to vested rights and the 
effect of a repeal of a statute upon transactions already concluded, may be 
sound law, and furnish a rule of decision in cases where they apply, but 
like most general rules of law, they are subject to exceptions and 
qualifications.165 
Most significantly, such arguments rest on a particular assumption – what 
Caldwell called “the fatal vice in the argument of those who maintain the continued 
validity of these contracts”166—namely,  
It is assumed that there was not when this contract was entered into, and is 
not now, as to contracts entered into before slavery was abolished, any 
distinction between a contract the consideration for which was slaves, and 
a contract made upon any other consideration.167 
164 18 F.Cas. at 846-7. 
165 Id. at 846-7. 
166 Id. at 847. 
167 Id. at 847 (emphasis added).  Kull, supra note 4, discusses this Caldwell opinion at 
502. 
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But (Caldwell’s argument might be glossed), slavery is different.168 As he put it, 
“Slavery was emphatically sui generis, and the most astute lawyer will be unable to find 
its analogy under our constitution.”169 Contracts for the purchase and sale of human 
beings are different from contracts based on consideration of other kinds.  For Caldwell, 
“It is obvious that this question cannot be determined without an inquiry into the nature 
and incidents of slavery, and the relation which the national government sustained, and 
now sustains to that institution.”170 Recall that, to Justice Lockwood of Illinois, a similar 
question was handily reduced to “a question of mere dry law, [which] does not involve in 
its investigation and decision, any thing relative to the humanity, policy, or legality of the 
laws and constitution, authorizing and recognizing the registering and indenturing of 
Negroes and mulattoes.”171 Though Lockwood wrote his opinion in Nance v. Howard in 
 
168 The general “public policy and natural law” arguments against enforceability are 
discussed by Kull, supra note 4, at 512 et seq. 
169 18 F.Cas. at 854. 
170 Id. at 847.  Similar points were made by others addressing the more general issue of 
the constitutionality of  “the extinction of debts for slaves.”  Kull quotes Oliver P. 
Morton, former Republican governor of Indiana: “contracts of that kind [relating to 
slaves] are held…to stand upon a different obligation, a different footing morally, and 
perhaps legally, from contracts of any other kind.  Slave property was swept away; those 
owning slaves lost them; and it was perhaps just as proper that those owning choses in 
action, debts, promissory notes, and bills of exchange given for slaves should lose them, 
also.”  Kull, supra note 4, at 501. 
171 1828 WL 1651 at *2. 
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1828, long before the Civil War and indeed even before the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 
the same basic approach was taken in 1869’s Roundtree, when the court distinguished “a 
contract for the sale of a slave” from “the collection of the money.”172 
By contrast, in determining whether Nicholson must pay Osborn on the 1861 
agreement for the now-emancipated Albert, Caldwell felt obliged to analyze the “nature 
and incidents of slavery” from a legal point of view.  His premises, most of which were 
familiar from the anti-slavery jurisprudence of his era, included  
[1] That slavery is against the law of God and the law of nature,  
[2] that slaves were regarded as persons and not property by the 
constitution of the United States,  
[3] that it was only within the slave states they were regarded as property,  
[4] that this status was stamped upon them by the local laws of those states 
and limited to their territorial operation, and  
[5] that those laws, though expressed in the form of written constitutions 
and statutes, had in their origin no higher or better sanction than brute 
force, and were constantly held, even by the courts that enforced them, to 
be contrary to natural right.173 
Because slavery was not supported by “natural law,” it was not supported by the 
common law either, so only positive local law could create and sustain it; hence, the 
repeal of such local law (including changes in state constitutions after the Civil War) left 
 
172 1869 WL 5419 at *4. 
173 18 F.Cas. at 847. 
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any theory of legal recovery based on the law of slavery utterly without support,174 contra 
anyone who would claim that “it is still obligatory on the courts to afford a remedy to the 
slave trader on his slave contracts.”175 
Whither comity?  Caldwell rejected it as a basis for enforcement, in part for 
reasons of non-mutuality of remedy.  As he stated, “The comity of states and nations does 
not demand the enforcement of slave contracts any more than it demands the recognition 
of the claim of the master to his slave.”176 In other words, if the facts of Roundtree been 
presented in reverse to the Illinois court before the war – payment made, but the slave not 
delivered – the Illinois court would not have ordered a person to be delivered over into 
slavery.  Why, then, should such a contract be enforced, as it were, from the other side?  
“[T]here is no obligation resting on any free state to afford a remedy on such 
contracts.”177 
Caldwell also specifically employed the public policy exception to avoid 
enforcement.  With understandable exaggeration, he wrote, “The courts are daily in the 
habit of denying a remedy on contracts because they are against public policy.”178 
The constitutional inhibition against state laws impairing the obligation of 
contracts is not limited in its operation to laws impairing the obligation of 
contracts, made and to be performed within the state.  The law of the 
 
174 See discussion at 18 F. Cas. at 850-51. 
175 Id. at 847. 
176 Id. at 849. 
177 Id. at 849. 
178 Id. at 855.  Cf. note 27 supra and associated discussion. 
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contract, -- the obligation of the contract, -- remains the same, and will be 
the same everywhere….But it does not follow that the constitution 
compels this state to enforce every species of contracts made in foreign 
states or other states of this Union….Neither the national [i.e., federal] nor 
the state courts will enforce contracts against good morals, or against 
religion, or against public right, nor contracts opposed to our national 
policy or national institutions.  Such contracts will be deemed nullities by 
the courts of this country, although they may be deemed valid by the laws 
of the place where they are made.179 
While “public policy” is sometimes hard to discern, that is not so here.  “The 
thirteenth amendment carries with itself the denunciation of slavery in every form; and 
that as plainly as if the mischief to be remedied thereby had been expressly recited, and 
the tendency of slavery openly denounced.”180 
In addition to familiar arguments showing that slavery violated public policy, 
establishing the appropriateness of the public policy exception as a basis for non-
enforcement, Caldwell built interestingly on a widely-cited quotation from Lord 
Mansfield applying the exception to “a contract…maintained by a courtesan for the price 
of her prostitution.”181 (Recall that Story, too, had offered as an example of a contract 
 
179 18 F.Cas. at 849.  (Caldwell here cites, of course, Story.) 
180 18 F.Cas. at 855. 
181 Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burrows 1077, 1084 (DATE), cited by Caldwell, 18 F. Cas. at 
849. 
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“against good morals, or religion, or public rights,”182 a contract “for future illicit 
cohabitation and prostitution.”183) Going beyond merely analogizing the two institutions 
or practices, Caldwell recognized that “slavery contained in itself all the worst social 
evils, and the sale of female slaves for purposes of prostitution was only one of its many 
revolting features.”184 It is striking to imagine that there might be readers for whom a 
moral objection to human chattel slavery could best be actuated by a reference to its 
sexual immorality; but his analysis also serves to remind us that even in the nineteenth 
century, legal opponents of slavery were well aware of its gendered, sexualized 
dimensions (even if these were undertheorized compared to more straightforward 
objections to the denial of liberty and unlawful, unjustified expropriation of labor). 
Caldwell also directly engaged with the Constitutional “impairment of the 
obligations of contract” argument.  First, he argued that “fundamental” changes of law 
unavoidably “impaired” any number and variety of contracts, but this in no way insulated 
the contracts from such changes.   
That a change in the fundamental law and policy of the government does 
necessarily operate to destroy the obligation of contracts and rights of 
action depending for their validity and enforcement on a law and policy 
inconsistent with the last declared will of the sovereign power, has been 
 
182 Story, 2nd ed., § 258(2), p. 334. 
183 Story, 2nd ed., § 258(2), pp. 334-335 of reprint. 
184 18 F. Cas. at 849. 
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expressly decided.185 
In the specific case of slavery, he argued,  
Take the case of a mortgage upon slaves, and there were many, at the time 
slavery was abolished….Now what becomes of the obligation of such a 
contract after the state in which the mortgaged slaves were found 
abolished slavery?….Is the mortgage still valid and binding, and are the 
slaves embraced in it excepted from the operation of the constitutional 
provision abolishing slavery?….Again, take the case of a contract for the 
hire of slaves, or a contract for the sale and delivery of slaves at a future 
time, or a note, payable in slaves.  What becomes of the obligation of the 
contract in all these cases?  Obviously it is impaired….[T]he prohibition 
on the states to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts…was never 
intended to sanction slavery….We have seen that its application to slave 
contracts would result in a prohibition upon the states from emancipating 
all slaves, when and so long as such slaves were held under mortgage, or 
other lien, arising out of a contract.  For in a mortgage, the pledge of the 
property is the very essence of the contract, and the right to subject the 
property pledged to the payment of the mortgaged debt, is the obligation 
of that contract.  More than half of the slaves of the south were thus 
 
185 18 F.Cas. at 855, citing Wheeler v. Moody, 9 Tex. 372, 376 (1853), 1853 WL 4207 
(striking a condition subsequent on pre-statehood land grants requiring financial support 
of the Roman Catholic Church as inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of 
Texas). 
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pledged at all times, and if this clause can be invoked to uphold slave 
contracts, there never was a time when it might not have been successfully 
appealed to by the states to stay emancipation.186 
Finally, Caldwell interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment as further undermining 
enforcement of such contracts at the national, constitutional level, as the amendment 
itself was “based on the broad principle that there shall be no further recognition by the 
national government or the states of the idea that there could lawfully be property in 
man.” 187 He stated, 
[T]his principle cuts its way through all vested rights and obligation of 
contracts based on slave codes, and operates with full force on claims and 
demands of every character originating in the idea that human beings were 
property, and the lawful subject of traffic.  This construction is in harmony 
with the spirit of our institutions, and is the necessary and logical result of 
the grounds upon which slavery was abolished without compensation to 
the slave owners.188 
186 18 F.Cas. at 854, 856.  
187 Id. at 856 (emphasis added). 
188 Id. at 856.  Caldwell also discussed the takings issue as applied to movables, noting 
that although “the states might destroy property in slaves, without compensation….this 
was not, and is not, the case with any other species of property.”  Id. at 849.  This is 
probably not an overstatement even today, after Andrus v. Allard, 441 U.S. 51, 65-66, 
100 U.S. 318 (1979), upheld a ban on commercial traffic in artifacts containing parts of 
certain protected birds (specifically, bald eagle feathers).  The Court there noted that “it is 
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On this basis, Caldwell relived Nicholson of his obligation to pay on the 
agreement.  
B. …But the U.S. Supreme Court Treats Emancipation As A Casualty Loss 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Salmon Chase 
(appointed by President Abraham Lincoln in 1864) reasoned similarly to District Judge 
Caldwell.  The Chief’s opinion is sufficiently brief that it can be reproduced in its 
entirety.  His grounds for affirmance: 
1st. That contracts for the purchase and sale of slaves were and are against 
sound morals and natural justice, and without support except in positive 
law. 
2d. That the laws of the several States by which alone slavery and slave 
contracts could be supported, were annulled by the thirteenth amendment 
of the Constitution which abolished slavery. 
3d. That thenceforward the common law of all the States was restored to 
its original principles of liberty, justice, and right, in conformity with 
which some of the highest courts of the late Slave States, notably that of 
Louisiana, have decided, and all might, on the same principles, decide, 
slave contracts to be invalid, as inconsistent with their jurisprudence, and 
this court has properly refused to interfere with those decisions. 
 
crucial [to the Constitutionality of the challenged regulations promulgated under the 
Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §668(a)] that appellees retain the rights to possess and 
transport their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds.” Id. at 66.  
Obviously, no such rights in formerly enslaved persons remained after emancipation. 
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4th. That the clause in the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution 
which forbids compensation for slaves emancipated by the thirteenth, can 
be vindicated only on these principles. 
5th. That clauses in State constitutions, acts of State legislatures, and 
decisions of State courts, warranted by the thirteenth and fourteenth 
amendments, cannot be held void as in violation of the original 
Constitution, which forbids the States to pass any law violating the 
obligation of contracts.189 
However, his brethren on the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed in nearly every 
particular.190 Chief Justice Chase was the lone dissenter.   
Justice Noah Swayne, writing for the majority, analyzed Osborn as a relatively 
simple case of private contract law and post-execution “destruction” of property.191 
Unsurprisingly, the Court began its analysis by saying of the contract, “Being valid when 
and where it was made, it was so everywhere,”192 and cited Story for the proposition that, 
 
189 80 U.S. 654, at 663-664. 
190 The Associate Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court at the time were Samuel Nelson, 
Nathan Clifford, Noah Swayne, Samuel Miller, David Davis, Stephen Field, William 
Strong, and Joseph Bradley.  http://supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf.
191 Osborn was one of five 1872 U.S. Supreme Court cases (three from Arkansas) on “the 
slave-contract problem” decided together, all with opinions written by Swayne.  The 
“quintet” of cases, three of which are more jurisdictional than substantive in nature, are 
discussed in Kull, supra note 4, at 502-507. 
192 80 U.S. at 656. 
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“With certain qualifications not necessary to be considered in this case, this is the rule of 
the law of nations.”193 
Arkansas’ post-Civil War state constitutional provisions invalidating slave 
contracts were of no effect, because “as to all prior transactions the [Arkansas] 
constitution is…clearly in conflict with that clause of the Constitution of the United 
States, which ordains that ‘no State shall’… ‘pass any law impairing the obligation of 
contracts,’”;194 moreover, “when the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States was adopted, the rights of the plaintiff [seller] in this action had become 
legally and completely vested.”195 As the Court ultimately concluded,  
Whatever we may think of the institution of slavery viewed in the light of 
religion, morals, humanity, or a sound political economy, -- as the 
obligation here in question was valid when executed, sitting as a court of 
justice, we have no choice but to give it effect.  We cannot regard it as 
differing in its legal efficacy from any other unexecuted contract to pay 
money made upon a sufficient consideration at the same time and place.196 
193 Id. The Court went further “It may be safely asserted that this contract when made 
could have been enforced in the courts of every State of the Union, and in the courts of 
every civilized country elsewhere.”  Id.
194 Id. at 656.  Arkansas was one of six states whose Reconstruction constitutional 
convention prohibited enforcement of “debts originating in the hire or purchase of 
slaves,” Kull, supra note 4 at 496. 
195 80 U.S. at 662. 
196 Id. at 663. 
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It is useful to track how the Court reaches this disappointing, if predictable, 
conclusion.  Rather than engaging directly with the realities of human chattel slavery, 
legal and otherwise, the Court denatured the case, first considering and rejecting a 
seemingly bizarre argument that Albert’s emancipation constituted a breach of warranty, 
because Albert turned out not to be “a slave for life,”197 as Osborn had expressly stated in 
the sale document.198 In fact, the idea that emancipation relieved buyers of contracts for 
slave purchases on a “breach of warranty” theory was widely advanced as a defense by 
debtors on such contracts after the Civil War, though rarely successfully.199 The Court 
further analogized Albert to a piece of real property, that might be taken by eminent 
domain without “a violation of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.”200 Osborn’s title in 
Albert was no less perfect, reasoned the Court, because the State itself might intrude upon 
it.  Indeed, the Court stated,  
As regards the principle involved [that loss by eminent domain is not a 
breach of warranty] we see nothing to distinguish those cases from the one 
before us.  In all of them the property was lost to the owner by the 
 
197 Id. at 655. 
198 Id. at 657.  Kull discusses the “breach of warranty” and eminent domain issues as 
treated by different Southern states, supra note 4, at 507-508. 
199 See Kull, supra note 4, at 494 and passim. The Court further notes that an express 
warranty against the “future event” that deprived the buyer of his property – 
emancipation – would have been enforceable, but that the Court will not “make contracts 
for the parties” and “interpolate such a stipulation.”  80 U.S. at 658-659. 
200 80 U.S. at 657. 
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paramount act of the State, which neither party anticipated, and in regard 
to which the contract was silent.  Emancipation and the eminent domain 
work the same result as regards the title and possession of the owner.  
Both are put an end to.  Why should the seller be liable in one case and not 
in the other?  We can see no foundation, in reason or principle, for such a 
claim.201 
This is a strange way of thinking about the abolition of slavery, since the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited compensation to slaveowners,202 
making clear that the abolition of slavery was not to be treated Constitutionally as a 5th 
Amendment “taking” mandating just compensation to former property owners.203 The 
defining feature of the taking by eminent domain – and arguably, therefore, of “private 
 
201 Id. at 658.  The Court stated that Nicholson could have protected himself against the 
“property” becoming worthless by demanding an express warranty against the future 
event of emancipation – and perhaps he should have, in March of 1861. “There, as in this 
case, the buyer might have protected himself by a proper warranty, but had failed to do 
so.”  Id. at 659.  Kull reviews the treatment of express warranties against emancipation, 
and the reflection of such risks in the decline in slave prices as the Civil War approached.  
Kull, supra note 4, at 510-511.  
202 “Neither the United States, nor any state, shall assume or pay…any claim for the loss 
or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims, shall be held 
illegal and voId.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Section 4, article 14. 
203 The Fifth Amendment provides, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
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property” itself in American law – is precisely that entitlement to compensation.  The 
obvious “foundation, in reason or principle,” therefore, for making the vendor suffer the 
loss when the vendee’s “property” is lost due to emancipation, and not when the same 
loss is suffered because of a post-sale exercise of eminent domain by the sovereign, is 
that in the latter case the State will be compensating the vendee, while in the former case 
the vendee bears the loss alone.204 
Enforcement or non-enforcement has a further political dimension.  While Judge 
Caldwell had pointed out the conceptual inconsistency in denying that emancipation was 
a taking while allowing private parties to recover from one another205 – either an enslaved 
person is, or is not, property, whose emancipation is, or is not, therefore a compensable 
loss – Kull points out that the unavailability of a “takings” remedy actually supported a 
Southern argument for denial of enforcement.  As he explains,  
by nullifying outstanding debts for slaves, the states might at least avoid 
compounding the original injustice [emancipation without compensation]: 
forcing persons already stripped of property to pay for what had been 
taken from them.  Nullification of slave debts caused that loss to be shared 
 
204 It is true that the vendee may suffer some uncompensated, or even incompensable loss 
– real property is unique, and may be worth much more to the vendee than the “just 
compensation” set by the Court after a taking.  Nevertheless, the Constitution ensures that 
the entire loss is not shifted onto him. 
205 “If a claim against the United States for a slave emancipated by that government is 
illegal and void, how can the claim of one citizen against another for that same slave be 
held legal and valid?”  18 F.Cas. at 856. 
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in some rough measure, affording a partial indemnity to certain former 
slaveowners at someone else’s expense.206 
And at the expense of logic, as well.  As we have seen, the tension between 
treating property in persons as “just like” other sorts of property, and the unavoidable 
difficulties of doing so, afflicted the entire jurisprudence of this area, including this case.  
The quality of the arguments inevitably suffered.  The Supreme Court identified as “a 
principle of universal jurisprudence” that “[r]ights acquired by a…contract executed 
according to statutes subsequently repealed subsist afterwards, as they were before, in all 
respects as if the statutes were still in full force.”207 But as the Court itself had just noted, 
as to slavery, “it rested upon universally recognized custom, and there were no statutes 
legalizing its existence.”208 In other words, the legal consequences of the abolition of 
slavery cannot simply be derived from principles employed to validate a contract made 
“illegal” by the repeal of some particular statute, because that did not occur.   
Moreover, slavery was an institution, or an arrangement, among persons, not 
something which merely created a species of property.  Elsewhere in the opinion the 
Court remarked, “Wherever [slavery is] found, the rights of the owner have been 
regarded there as surrounded by the same sanctions and covered by the same protection 
as other property.”209 But the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition on compensation is 
squarely to the contrary; otherwise, emancipation would have been a compensable 
 
206 Kull, supra note 4, at 517. 
207 80 U.S. at 662. 
208 Id. at 661 (emphasis added). 
209 Id.
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“taking,” eliminating the need for debtors to try to escape their financial obligations 
under slave contracts in private suits brought to mitigate the loss.   
Interestingly, particularly in light of some contemporary debates about so-called 
“foreign precedent,” 210 the Court also used a foreign decision, Mittelholzer v. 
Fullarton,211 to bolster its conclusion.  The abolition of slavery in British Guyana in 
1834212 first put “former slaves in a state of mandatory ‘apprenticeship’ to their former 
owners for a term of years….the colonial authorities [later] abolished the status of 
‘apprenticeship,’ thereby completing the emancipation of the former slaves.”213 In 
 
210 The use by the U.S. Supreme Court of British and other non-U.S. cases has recently 
spawned a significant literature, to which this Article does not intend to add.   See, e.g., 
Osmar J. Benvenuto, “Reevaluating the Debate Surrounding the Supreme Court’s Use of 
Foreign Precedent,” 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2692 (April 2006), and materials cited therein.  
It is worth noting, however, that the British case cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Osborn, Mittelholzer v. Fullarton, was only a few decades old, was decided long after the 
United States Constitution was ratified, and is treated by the U.S. Supreme Court as 
“settling” the case (“But we think the exact point here under consideration was settled by 
the Court of Queen’s Bench”). 80 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added).  Kull also mentions, 
without discussing, that this “decision is treated as authoritative in several of the 
American cases.”  Kull, supra note 4, at footnote 61. 
211 6 Adolphus & Ellis 989, 6 Q.B. 989, 1020, 115 Eng. Rep. 373, 385 (1844), aff'd per 
curiam, 6 Q.B. 1022, 115 Eng. Rep. 385 (Exch. Ch. 1845). 
212 See, e.g., http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/country_profiles/1211428.stm. 
213 Kull, supra note 4, at footnote 61. 
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Mittelholzer, the English court held that the “determin[ation of] the apprenticeship” after 
four of six installments had been paid provided no defense in the suit for payment on the 
last two installments.214 
In electing to stay close to a well-charted path of commercial law, the U.S. 
Supreme Court quoted approvingly one of the British judges who characterized the 
situation as calling for the determination of “who shall bear the loss occasioned by a vis 
major?”215 Once put this way it matters little whether the slave is analogized to chattel or 
real property – under the common law of that time, if title has passed, so too has the risk 
of loss.216 The universal emancipation of enslaved persons, premised on the repudiation 
of the institution of slavery itself at the Constitutional level, is not enough to relieve the 
debtor from his slave-purchase debt, or to force the slave-vendor to bear any financial 
loss.  Title has passed.  At this point, with the outcome of the case a foregone conclusion, 
 
214 6 Adolphus & Ellis 989, 6 Q.B. 989, 1020, 115 Eng. Rep. 373, 385 (1844), aff'd per 
curiam, 6 Q.B. 1022, 115 Eng. Rep. 385 (Exch. Ch. 1845), cited at 80 U.S. at 659. 
215 80 U.S. at 659. 
216 Common law, codified in the Uniform Sales Act (later changed and superseded by the 
Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2-509) had provided, “Unless otherwise agreed, the 
goods remain at the seller’s risk until the property therein is transferred to the buyer.” 
Unif. Sales Act, § 22.  According to Williston, “the effect and purpose of this section may 
be gathered from the following statement of the common law:  risk of loss generally 
attends title.”  2 S. Williston, WILLISTON ON SALES 692-93 (2d ed. 1924).  The civil law, 
from Roman times, was the same – as the Latin maxim had it, Res perit suo domino (The 
loss falls on the owner).  80 U.S. at 660.  See also Kull, supra note 4, at 509-510. 
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the Court spares a few lines for rhetorical condemnation of slavery itself, referring to 
“[t]he atrocious traffic in human beings, torn from their country to be transported to 
hopeless bondage in other lands, known as the slave trade.”217 
We might wish that when the Court, as the opinion draws to a close, refers to a 
“flood-tide of intolerable evils,” it is presciently remarking on the effluence from slavery, 
which today, as during Reconstruction, threaten at times to submerge our polity.  But it is 
not to be.  The threat to “the repose and welfare of all communities,” which “would shake 
the social fabric to its foundations” (a strangely mixed metaphor that conjures up the 
image of a tent in the wind), is any legal doctrine that would permit “the destruction of 
vested rights by implication.”218 That is the “mischief” that must be avoided, with its 
effect of “tak[ing] away one man’s property and giv[ing] it to another….forbidden by the 
fundamental principles of the social compact.”219 If the buyer is not required to pay, the 
vendor will have lost his property without compensation, and, as the Court says 
explicitly, “without due process of law.”220 In the end, the “takings” analysis comes 
 
217 80 U.S. at 661.  
218 80 U.S. at 662. 
219 80 U.S. at 663. 
220 80 U.S. at 663.  Quaere, however, whether the due process rights of slave-vendors 
were not satisfied by the Reconstruction-era state legislative proceedings that resulted in 
the enactment of state constitutional provisions barring enforcement of slave contracts, 
such as the 1868 Arkansas constitution “which annuls all contracts for the purchase or 
sale of slaves, and declares that no court of the State should take cognizance of any suit 
founded on such a contract.”  80 U.S. at 656.  
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back.  The slave vendor suffers no “taking,” indeed, no loss at all – the cost is borne by 
the vendee, in the end simply rewarding those vendors who sold slaves “short” at the 
twilight of that institution at the expense of those who invested in its long-term viability 
by purchasing slaves. 
Conclusion 
Like Justice Lockwood in Willard,221 the Osborn Court seemed to feel it could not 
completely neglect to address formerly enslaved persons – albeit as objects, not subjects, 
of law.  The third-to-last sentence of the opinion says only, “Neither the rights nor the 
interests of those of the colored race lately in bondage are affected by the conclusions we 
have reached.”222 Superficially and literally, perhaps, this is true.  Just as Roundtree was 
a dispute between the descendants of a slave-vendor and his slave-vendee cousin, and 
Willard was a criminal proceeding for harboring a slave, the outcome of Osborn could 
neither enslave nor emancipate anyone.  But for a self-described “court of justice” to 
focus exclusively on the fair allocation of the lost property value in slaves as between 
antebellum buyers and sellers, reflects a shocking unconcern and naiveté about the 
“rights” and the “interests” of formerly enslaved persons.  In the words of Judge 
Caldwell, we deplore that “the courts are still to guard this relic of a condemned system 
by adjusting the balance of justice between the buyer and seller under such painful and 
exasperating circumstances[] – and this, when the evil policy of slavery, in all its parts 
and functions, has been so authoritatively declared[].”223 We might ask, as we did about 
 
221 1843 WL 4112 at *13. 
222 80 U.S. at 663. 
223 18 F.Cas. at 855. 
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Eliza, why it never occurred to the Court that the most important loss to be made good, 
even speaking purely legally and economically, was the wholly unjustified and 
unjustifiable expropriation of generations of labor of the enslaved persons themselves, so 
“lately in bondage,” injured citizens whose claim for justice from the courts of the United 
States renders those of individual slave-vendors and slave-vendees trivial by comparison. 
Is a contract for the purchase and sale of a human being sui generis, or just 
another species of contract for the sale of goods and chattels?  Or is it neither of these, or 
somehow simultaneously both – a kind of reductio ad absurdum of a metaphysics of 
contract so general, so abstract, that it produces willful blindness about the subject (in 
both senses) of the contract itself?  There is, as we have seen, nothing in the language or 
doctrine of contracting itself to, as it were, rise up and repudiate such agreements. 
 Yet in arriving at a historical judgment of these cases, it is essential to see that 
they genuinely could have been decided otherwise.  The judicial literary style often 
emphasizes the degree to which prior cases and relevant doctrines “compel” a certain 
outcome, in the face of which the principled jurist cannot but comply.  In the application 
of the public policy exception to contract validation, that apologetic tone should not 
mislead.  The exception itself was and is flexible enough to accommodate any issue the 
judge deems significant enough – that is the source of both its strength and its danger. 
The applicability of the “public policy” exception to enforcement of out-of-state 
contracts for the purchase and sale of human beings is a problem thus simultaneously 
unique, unquestionably deep and important in its own right; and utterly paradigmatic of 
the permanent tension between that aspect of justice that resides in formal, predictable 
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rules (such as comity in contract validation), and the uncertainty introduced by any 
“escape device,” no matter how necessary to permit justice to be done.  
In the end, the delicate inter-state issues of comity and public policy, between and 
among states with fundamentally different relationships to the institution of slavery, were 
“adjudicated” on the battlefields of the Civil War.  But the military success of the Union 
which might have been translated into a much more thoroughgoing extirpation of slavery, 
root and branch, became something much less. 
In the end, antebellum contracts for the purchase and sale of human beings 
remained enforceable by breached-against vendors because the U.S. Supreme Court said 
so.  But long before that mandate, jurists in non-slaveholding states failed to use the legal 
tools at their disposal to their maximum liberatory potential.   
These cases remind us that the law rarely compels one outcome.  Strictly 
speaking, after Osborn, while a former slave state might not be free to repudiate a slave 
contract (and favor debtors arguably more loyal to the Confederacy over creditors), the 
issues presented by interstate enforcement remained distinct.  The failure of non-
slaveholding state courts to employ the public policy exception before or after the war is 
therefore fairly criticized, even if, by itself, non-enforcement would in no sense remedy 
the legal wrong done to the enslaved persons at issue.  Repudiation would, as Caldwell 
argued, have conveyed some sense that contracts for the purchase and sale of human 
beings (or other similar arrangements, such as mortgages for their purchase price secured 
by the enslaved persons themselves) formed no part of the ordinary common law of 
contracts, but rather required for their continued vitality the positive enactments of 
slaveholding states.  Repudiation would also, in that sense, dovetail with that 
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understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition on “takings”-style compensation 
for emancipation which amounts to a denial of “property in man.”  But we have seen the 
limits of such an approach as well.  As a practical matter, repudiation neither directly 
benefits the formerly enslaved, nor sends a meaningful message to former slave-dealers – 
it simply undoes the last slave-transfer transaction in each case, forcing the economic 
losses from the debtor class onto a creditor class not obviously better able to bear it.  As 
we know, the “Elizas” of the world never did get paid, and for all that we, with the 
neoabolitionists and Judge Caldwell, endeavor to deny the reality of “property in man” 
(or woman), the legal accoutrements of its existence were and are inescapable.   
An aura of pathos unavoidably surrounds Caldwell’s eloquent plea:  
Could it have been intended that free citizens should still be the subject matter of 
litigation in the courts of justice, as chattels?….The government that would permit its 
free citizens to be thus degraded in the interest of slavery and slave traders, would be 
unworthy of the name of a free republic.224 
This, then, is our continuing challenge – to employ our courts of justice to honor, 
and never degrade, one another, and to be worthy of the name of a free republic. 
 
224 18 F.Cas. at 855. 
